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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
 
1. In Sri Lanka, land has been an important trigger in the political dynamics leading 
to the outbreak of armed conflict and the armed conflict itself has also significantly 
affected land use and land rights in the North and East regions of the country. 
Agricultural land use has declined, access to land has been restricted and tenure security 
has been uncertain in view of the delicate security situation and population movements 
due to displacement and return. While the ceasefire agreement has brought some relief to 
people in the North and East, it has also created new land related disputes due to 
population return and the emergence of inter-ethnic tensions in the East. The impact of 
the Indian Ocean Tsunami on coastal land in the North and East has produced additional 
land-related issues.  
2. The core premise of this report is two fold: land issues in Sri Lanka cannot be 
seen in isolation from the ethnic and political conflict and, at the same time, even though 
land conflict is often linked with the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka, a large number of land 
conflicts in the North and East can be resolved prior to a full and national political 
solution to the ethnic situation. This report therefore: 
 analyzes constraints and opportunities for an effective governance framework for 
land access and land tenure security in the conflict-affected areas of Sri Lanka, 
 develops a comprehensive typology of land-related conflicts to inform policy 
dialogue and to identify types of conflict that may be resolvable in the current 
situation and to distinguish them from those which are not, 
 identifies policy criteria to further ensure a conflict-sensitive approach in a post-
conflict and post-tsunami context whereby regional, religious and ethnic balances 
in the allocation and/or restitution of land and property rights are to be addressed. 
The report synthesizes existing studies, mainly qualitative assessments of limited scope 
and outreach, but a more in-depth quantitative assessment may be conducted later on, 
when the political situation is conducive to do so. 
                                                 
1
 Policy Note on Land and Conflict in the North and East of Sri Lanka prepared by Benedikt Korf 
(Department of Geography, University of Liverpool), and Isabel Lavadenz (Senior Land Policy Specialist-
SASAR-World Bank). 
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3. In the present (semi-) post-conflict situation, the different ethnic communities 
living in the North and East have developed ethnicity-specific interpretations of the 
historical process and the current status of land tenure security, land access and the policy 
framework. These different perceptions are expressions of accumulated grievances of 
inter-ethnic antagonisms and deep-lying searches for improved livelihoods. Although 
these grievances are now mostly expressed in ethnic dimensions, the underlying causes 
for such disputes are often rooted in structural causes not necessarily related to the ethnic 
question, such as increasing pressures on scarce resources and limited economic life 
opportunities. The armed conflict, however, has changed the dynamics and the political 
environment within which such land issues are to be resolved. Some of the Government’s 
land use policies have been considered to be a trigger to create these ethnicized 
interpretations of land-related issues.  
4. Furthermore, the impacts of the civil war on land use have resulted in a dramatic 
decline in the extent of agricultural land currently utilized. The Agricultural census 
estimates that the acreage of utilized agricultural land has diminished by more than 25% 
from 1982 to 2002, while it has increased in the not war-affected North Central Province 
by 30% in the same time period. This dramatic decrease in land use is largely due to 
population displacement, restricted (physical) access to land (due to insecurity), political 
instability and shrinking economic opportunities. A general level of insecurity has often 
decreased tenure security and restricted land access. 
5. The signing of the ceasefire agreement (CFA) in February 2002 has created 
prospects for reconstruction and development in the North and East. The CFA provided 
freedom of movements and offered opportunities for displaced persons and absentee 
landlords to return to their places and properties. A number of land-related issues have 
arisen in this highly dynamic environment: On the one hand, returnees often find their 
properties occupied by secondary occupants. At the same time, some dormant land 
disputes that had been suppressed during the times of armed confrontation now emerge to 
the open. Many of these disputes have their roots in structural, long-term issues (e.g. land 
scarcity in densely populated areas), but have become politicized and reinterpreted in 
ethnic terms. If the latter cannot be contained, they may contribute to a destabilization of 
inter-ethnic areas, in particular in the East.  
6. This report provides a detailed analysis of different types of land-related issues in 
the North and East after the ceasefire agreement (Table 4; Annex 1). It distinguishes three 
types or levels of land issues. On each of the three levels, the analysis distinguishes 
between land tenure security (property rights, security of rights, transactions, 
documentation etc.), land access (informal access to land-related livelihoods) and 
governance issues (legislation, law enforcement, land management):  
i. Level 1 - inter-individual, intra-ethnic land disputes and property issues 
(individual-individual, individual-state) – no inter-ethnic dimension involved: 
Land tenure issues include unlawful secondary occupancy of property and land, 
disputed titles (esp. false deeds), boundary disputes, loss or destruction of title 
documents, unclear property rights to temple lands. Access problems are prevalent 
in particular in heavily mined areas, but also relates to the problem of landless 
returnees. 
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ii. Level 2 - inter-communal or inter-individual, inter-ethnic land disputes or 
property rights issues (individual-individual, individual-communal, communal-
communal): Land tenure and property rights issues include inter-ethnic disputes 
over water allocation and land access in irrigation schemes, competing land uses, 
fishing rights and land transfers done during times of distress. Access problems 
relate to the inaccessibility of agricultural land due to persistent insecurity. 
iii. Level 3 - inter-individual or inter-communal land or property rights issues, where 
the inter-ethnic dimension has become dominant and the issue highly politicized: 
These land issues are subject to political negotiations between the parties to the 
conflict. They include land tenure and land access problems relating to high 
security zones or militarily occupied territories and issues of devolution of powers 
between centre and provinces. 
10. The Indian Ocean Tsunami has further added to land-related problems in the 
conflict-affected areas of the North and East. The tsunami has displaced more than 
500,000 people adding to the already large number of conflict-affected displaced persons. 
The originally proposed buffer zone policy of the Sri Lankan government has created 
confusion about the property status of land situated within the buffer zone. Table 7 
specifies the land-related issues pertinent in the post-tsunami recovery process. 
Particularly important are issues relating to loss of title documents during the tsunami 
(incl. the state’s back-up copies in the registries), and the uncertainties relating to 
relocation from the buffer zone, including shifting land values and prices.  
11. Following the analysis in the report, six major trajectories are identified that 
define opportunities and constraints for effectively governing land-related issues in the 
North and East: 
i. Current and emerging land disputes need to be understood in the context of the 
history of past land policies and the perceptions of ethnic biases that have 
developed out of these. 
ii. The armed conflict has further aggravated the pressure on land and has increased 
ethnic grievances related to land use. 
iii. Although ethnic tensions appear in relation to land disputes, competing access to 
land is often rooted in deeper lying structural causes, such as scarce resources, 
decreasing economic opportunities etc. 
iv. There is some evidence to suggest that some past policies and the impacts of 
armed conflict have transformed the governance frame for land access and land 
tenure in the North and East, which has tended to encourage ethnic favoritism on 
local and regional scales. 
v. In more operational terms, key aspects of tenure security include the recognition 
and recording of land-related rights. 
vi. The government’s buffer zone policy after the tsunami has increased uncertainty 
over land tenure security in the affected areas. 
12. This report does not provide blue print solutions, but rather aims at contributing to 
the overall debate distinguishing issues that are possible to address through 
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administrative and operational decisions from those which are ethnically and/or 
politically sensitive and will be part of negotiations between the conflict parties in the 
peace process. These policy issues include: 
i. Land tenure security: there is a need for an effective land administration system 
that responds to the particular context of a conflict and reconstruction situation. It 
is imperative for the state to provide public guarantee of tenure security by 
establishing, among others, alternative means for effective conflict resolution at 
the local level (e.g. inter-communal mechanisms). Fully equipped and capable 
land-related institutions should be put in place, in order to effectively enforce 
property and land use rights. These are required at the national and local levels 
and within and outside the governmental machinery. 
ii. Land access: The particular Sri Lankan conflict context calls for differentiated 
and innovative approaches to guarantee access to land, in particular for the most 
vulnerable population, taking the ethnic balance should be a primary criteria. 
Issues related to access include addressing (and further preventing) conflicts 
arising from displacement and returnees, land mines, female headed households 
(usually widows), and biased state-driven land allocation processes. Unambiguous 
policy framework for state land distribution, land allocation to returnees, tsunami 
affected and displaced population, and overall access to land is essential. 
iii. The overriding principle for dispute resolution should be subsidiarity, i.e. disputes 
should be solved on the lowest institutional level possible. There is also a need for 
fast-track mechanisms that could, for example, deal with minor land disputes 
surrounding residential land, boundary disputes etc. (Level 1) and for making use 
of inter-communal dispute resolution mechanisms in minor inter-ethnic land 
disputes (Level 2) (see Annex 2, table 8 for details).  
iv. Governance is a cross-cutting issue for land tenure security and land access. A 
number of legal reforms are currently discussed to make land rights and land use 
policies more effective. These reforms in policy need to trickle down to the 
practice of land administration, especially with regard to land allocation and land 
rights. As part of good governance, limiting discretionary bureaucratic behavior is 
a must. Bureaucratic practices need to become inclusive, transparent, accountable, 
participatory and consultative as well as locality-specific, criteria-based and 
comprehensive. Such good governance practices are instrumental in re-
establishing the credibility of land administration. 
 
 
 5 
Sri Lanka 
 
Land and Conflict in the North and East 
Policy Note 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1. In Sri Lanka, land has been an important trigger in the political dynamics leading 
to the outbreak of armed conflict and the armed conflict itself has also significantly 
affected land use and land rights in the North and East regions of the country. 
Agricultural land use has declined, access to land has been restricted and tenure security 
uncertain in view of the delicate situation and population movements due to displacement 
and return. While the ceasefire agreement has brought some relief to people in the North 
and East, it has also created new land related disputes due to population return and the 
emergence of inter-ethnic tensions in the East. The high percentage of the population 
living in rural areas combined with the high dependence on agricultural production puts 
high pressure on land resources and further reduces land availability. Due to the current 
situation of post-conflict transition and post-tsunami recovery, a careful analysis is 
required to ensure that land-related issues do not interfere with the prospects for social 
and economic recovery and peace building.  
2. Experiences from other conflict-affected countries, such as Uganda, Mozambique, 
East Timor, and South Africa have demonstrated that the relationship between land and 
conflict is complex and multidimensional (USAID, 2004), and that usually it needs to be 
addressed sooner rather than later. Land combines strong economic, cultural, social and 
emotional values in society and constitutes both an essential source of livelihood in rural 
areas characterized by a scarcity of productive assets, but also more generally a central 
element in entangled, varied and complex social relations within which conflict between 
individuals and groups are bred. Although land issues are often rooted in conflict 
situations, it is quite difficult to establish the precise role that land plays in the outbreak 
of conflict (OECD, 2004). However, as conflict deepens and turns violent, territorial 
control and land grabbing are frequently used as the most effective war strategy or 
conversely, conflict and war are used to gain access to resources, including land. In post-
conflict transition, countries face a number of land-related challenges associated with 
post-conflict reconstruction and peace consolidation, which often are extremely difficult 
to address successfully. The importance of land and property issues to post-conflict 
development is often not recognized early in the process, even though they are 
intrinsically linked to the political economy, livelihood strategies, vulnerability and 
socioeconomic development. 
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LAND ISSUES IN POST-CONFLICT AND POST-TSUNAMI SRI LANKA  
3. In Sri Lanka, competing control over land has been intimately linked with the 
history of agricultural development, especially in the colonization areas of the East 
(Moore 1989; Peebles 1990) and has been an important trigger for inter-ethnic violence. 
Territorial control, spatial distribution of ethnic groups and access to land and distribution 
of government welfare have become contentious political issues. At the same time, it is 
believed that the armed conflict has significantly affected land access for agricultural and 
residential purposes, especially due to access restrictions imposed by the conflict parties, 
insecure and unclear property and use rights due to population displacement and high 
mobility as well as inefficient or ethnically biased implementation of land-related laws 
and regulations. There are enough elements to believe that without a sustainable, fair, and 
grounded solution of the land and property rights question in the North-East, tensions 
could not only increase but prevent a sustainable peace and reconstruction process.  
4. Since land disputes are often related to the broader ethnic conflict, very little is 
done to address these in fear of triggering inter-ethnic tensions and grievances further. 
However, although the ethnic conflict and armed confrontation have aggravated land 
tenure insecurity and land access problems, not all of these originate from the armed 
conflict alone. Many are rooted in structural issues, such as increasing land scarcity due 
to population pressures and decreasing economic returns from land use, as well as weak 
and/or politicized governance structures relating to land use issues. The challenge of 
post-conflict reconstruction and development lies therefore in addressing these structural 
factors, in improving the related governance framework in the North and East and in 
avoiding land disputes to become enmeshed with broader political dynamics of 
ethnicized grievances. 
5. This report suggests that one cannot wait with addressing land conflicts in the 
North and East, until a formal settlement of the ethnic conflict is accomplished. Land 
issues affect many development and reconstruction efforts after the ceasefire agreement 
and in the current post-tsunami recovery process. Therefore, this report analyses what 
kind of land conflicts have emerged in the North and East and how they are linked with 
the broader ethnic conflict (or not). It suggests which types of conflict may be addressed 
immediately in order to sustain development and reconstruction efforts and how this may 
best be undertaken. The report also delineates those issues which may be too sensitive to 
be tackled before a broader political settlement has been reached. 
6. The effects of the Tsunami of 26 December 2004 have added further land-related 
problems. First of all, it has washed away lands in already land-scarce areas and 
displaced more than 400.000 people leaving more than 100,000 homeless/landless. 
Secondly, the majority of the victims often also lost proof of ownership or land use rights 
both in the books and on the ground (e.g. most land markers and boundaries are totally or 
partially destroyed). Finally, right after the tsunami, as part of its recovery and 
rehabilitation strategy, the Sri Lankan government has announced and made legal 
notification of its intention to enforce a setback area. As a result, people formerly living 
in these areas will be relocated to areas outside the setback area. 
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OBJECTIVES, SCOPE AND AUDIENCE 
7. This report analyzes constraints and opportunities for an effective governance 
framework for land access and land tenure security in the conflict-affected areas (CAAs) 
– many of which are also tsunami affected. In particular, it aims at deepening the 
understanding of the relationships between the current land tenure system, existing land 
policy and (semi-)post-conflict and post-tsunami reconstruction and development 
programs.  
8. The scope of the analysis entails a mapping of all issues pertaining to land rights, 
land access and land policy in the CAAs, such as land tenure security, restitution of 
property rights, access to land for vulnerable groups and the practical implementation of 
land allocation policies. In this context, the study 
 looks into private land and state land alienated for private use rights with a focus 
on rural areas and covers urban CCAs affected by the Tsunami, where 
appropriate.  
 develops a comprehensive typology of land-related conflicts to inform policy 
dialogue and to provide the foundation for a more in-depth assessment later on.  
 identifies policy criteria to further ensure a conflict-sensitive approach in a post 
conflict and a post-tsunami context whereby regional, religious and ethnic 
balances in the allocation and /or restitution of land and property rights need to be 
adequately and promptly addressed to ensure a peaceful and equitable 
reconstruction and development process.  
9. Methodology. The policy note synthesizes existing studies to derive a typology of 
land-related issues and their best-suited resolution mechanisms. The typology allows to 
map out policy issues and interventions relevant for (semi-) post-conflict and post-
tsunami reconstruction efforts and to suggest new sets of research questions which could 
form the basis of a more in-depth quantitative analysis in the future.  
Data sources. Due to the conflict situation, quantitative data is largely out of date, 
government statistics often rely on crude estimations. Thus far, no comprehensive 
household survey has been conducted and the agricultural census conducted in 2002 was 
not comprehensive for the whole North and East. In view of these data limitations, this 
report works with the following qualitative studies conducted in the last five years: the 
Centre for Policy Alternatives (CPA) has conducted various studies on land issues after 
the ceasefire agreement, with a particular focus on gender issues (CPA 2003, 2005a, 
2005b, 2005c). The Northeast Housing Reconstruction Programme (NEHRP) has 
investigated land issues relating to housing (NEHRP 2004a, 200ab). UNHCR Sri Lanka 
has conducted a study on land and property issues relating to the return of internally 
displaced persons and refugees living abroad, with an update after the Tsunami (UNHCR 
2003, 2005). The Foundation for Co-existence (FCE) has been involved in restitution of 
Muslim land rights in the East and has conducted various studies in this regard 
(Rupesinghe 2002, FCE 2003, Hasbullah et al. 2005). Although these reports have 
compiled a large amount of information, they cannot yet claim a complete representation 
of the situation in the North and East; however, the state of information collection is 
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sufficient to develop a typology of land-related issues and to identify some policy 
recommendations. 
10. Audience. The report comes at a critical juncture, since the major players in the 
Sri Lankan conflict are currently seeking to establish political, social, and economic 
stability following almost twenty years of armed conflict. A ceasefire agreement has been 
in effect since February 2002, which marked the beginning of a transitional phase that 
could lead to a permanent solution of the conflict. However, the current political situation 
in Sri Lanka remains fragile with the two conflict parties being situated in a stalemate of 
no war, but not yet peace either.  It is now widely accepted that both the dynamics and 
solutions of the conflict are closely linked to domestic politics and development 
processes. This report is meant to feed reconstruction efforts and policy dialogue on 
development and land-related issues. As such, it is expected to be useful for policy 
makers, practitioners, Government officials and civil society actors. 
Structure. The report starts with an analysis of the link between past land policies and 
inter-ethnic grievances relating to land in Sri Lanka pointing to the different perceptions 
pertaining among the three ethnic groups. In the subsequent section, the report discusses 
the impacts of the armed conflict on land use in the North and East. The report then 
assesses the current situation regarding land tenure security and land access as it can be 
found after the ceasefire agreement in 2002 and suggests a typology to analyze different 
forms and types of land issues. It also discusses the implications of the tsunami and 
policies taken after the tsunami with regard to land issues in the North and East. The 
report comes up with five core trajectories of findings and uses these to derive some 
policy conclusions. 
 
 
BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW 
 
11. The ethnicized conflict in Sri Lanka can be characterized as a multi-dimensional 
phenomenon, or a ‘conflict cocktail’ (Korf, 2004), because social and political cleavages 
occurred at various levels along many lines of dissent between Sinhalese, Tamils, and 
Muslims. The fundamental issue of the conflict is the grievance between the Tamil 
minority and the Sinhalese-Buddhist majority, which escalated into a war between the 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and the largely Sinhalese armed forces. In the 
conflict-affected North and East, rival claims to land are rooted in the memory and 
perception of the multi-ethnic population. Many Tamils have perceived the expansion of 
Sinhalese settlements in the Northeast as an act of political and geographic ‘colonization 
of traditional Tamil areas’ (Peebles 1990). The Sinhalese have seen it as an expansion 
into areas that they abandoned in ancient times (Peiris 1991). Muslim grievances have 
intensified after being evicted from their land by the LTTE during the civil war 
(Hasbullah et al 2005).
2
  
                                                 
2
 The conflict affected mainly the Northeast and neighboring provinces. Districts of the Northeast are 
Ampara, Batticoloa, Jaffna, Kilinochchi, Mannar, Mulaituva, Trincomalee and Vavuniya. Neighbouring 
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PERCEPTIONS OF THE THREE ETHNIC COMMUNITIES:  
12. In the present (semi-) post-conflict situation, the different ethnic communities 
living in the North and East have developed ethnicity-specific interpretations of the 
historical process and the current status of land tenure, land access and the related 
governance and policy framework. The following representations of community 
perceptions focus on interpretations of the current stituation, but it must be noted that 
these perceptions are influenced by their interpretations of past land policies.
3
 
i. Sinhalese perceptions: Many Sinhalese settlers in the North and East are 
particularly concerned that devolution of powers or wide-ranging autonomy for 
the North and East in an administrative set-up dominated by Tamils and the LTTE 
will place them in a politically vulnerable position and will make it difficult for 
them to claim their rights to land. These Sinhalese settlers came to colonization 
schemes in the North and East in expectation of finding a stable livelihood. 
Instead, they were affected by Tamil militancy, insecurity due to armed conflict 
and some became displaced. Many displaced Sinhalese continue to be afraid of 
resettling in their places of origin because of the continuous uncertainty of these 
often highly disputed border areas. Especially border villages have been affected 
by attacks from the LTTE and have sought closer collaboration with the Sri 
Lankan security forces. Many Sinhalese farmers continue to face obstacles and 
fear to access paddy fields located close to or in LTTE controlled areas. In 
addition, Sinhalese living in Amparai have expressed concern about the organized 
efforts by local Muslim representatives to acquire state lands for their own 
community.  
ii. Tamil perceptions: Most Tamils living in the North and East portray land tenure 
and access problems through the lens of what they consider ethnically 
discriminating past land colonization policies. In the view of many Tamils, these 
land colonization policies and the practice of land administration in the Nothr and 
East thereafter have favored Sinhalese settlers and disadvantaged Tamils. Many 
Tamils expect some of these perceived injustices to be rectified in a peace 
process. In addition, many displaced Tamils still await their chance to return to 
their places of origin, because they are either not accessible or insecure. In the 
East, Tamil-Muslim grievances over land access have emerged over the last 
twenty years. Tamils are particularly concerned about the growing influence of 
Muslim politicians and politics, which in the view of Tamils, favor Muslims and 
make them in their view partial war winners, especially in Amparai. Some of 
these grievances have come to the open after the ceasefire agreement. The 
continuous militarization of public space in the North and East and the rising 
political violence between different Tamil militant groups and the LTTE creates a 
place of high uncertainty and insecurity for Tamil citizens living in the North and 
East.  
                                                                                                                                                 
districts are Anuradhapura, Pollonnaruwa (North-Central Province), Moneragala (Uva Province) and 
Puttlam (North-Western Province). 
3
 Sources: Asia Foundation 2004, FCE 2003, Hasbullah et al. 2005. 
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iii. Muslim perceptions: Muslims, the second largest ethnic group in the North and 
East feel that they have always been discriminated against in past state land 
alienation and development. Further, they feel that the armed conflict has 
prevented them having access as well as maintaining ownership of land. Muslims 
consider that they own and occupy comparatively lesser proportion of usable 
(private) land in the East. Due to natural population growth, land scarcity in their 
own settlements continues to increase. Muslims tend to live in concentrated 
locations, which are considered places of Muslimness. Their place of work is 
often geographically separated from their place of living. Muslims continue to be 
aggrieved about their inability to access cultivation and residential land located in 
LTTE controlled areas. In addition, they are concerned about their rights and 
political leverage power in a prospectively LTTE dominated autonomous North 
and East. Therefore, Muslim politicians have started to argue in favor of an own 
Muslim homeland, which is considered to bring security to Muslims living in the 
East. 
These different perceptions are expressions of accumulated grievances of inter-ethnic 
antagonisms and deep-lying searches for improved livelihoods. Although these 
grievances are now mostly expressed in ethnic dimensions, the underlying causes for 
such disputes are often rooted in structural causes not necessarily related to the ethnic 
question, such as increasing pressures on scarce resources and limited economic life 
opportunities, but the armed conflict has changed the dynamics and the political 
environment within which such land issues are to be resolved. Past land use policies of 
the central government have been an important trigger to create these ethnicized 
interpretations of land-related issues.  
 
PAST LAND USE POLICIES
4
 
13. Successive Sri Lankan governments have developed land use policies supportive 
of the rural small-holder farmers and their request for cultivation land. These past land 
policies in dry zone Sri Lanka need to be understood as a response to colonial land use 
policies. The British colonial administration, aiming at facilitating the acquisition of land 
for (private investors’) plantation development, declared all land not permanently 
cultivated or demonstrably under private ownership to be Crown ownership (Lands 
Encroachment Ordinance No. 12 of 1840, also known as Waste Lands Ordinance). This 
denied a large part of the rural population, especially in the wetlands, legal and physical 
access to grazing land and land for shifting cultivation (chena). Since this time, almost 
80% of the overall land area in Sri Lanka is considered to be state land. Since the 
establishment of the 1928 Land Commission, the 1935 Land Development Ordinance and 
specifically after Sri Lanka gained independence in 1948, successive Sri Lankan 
governments have alienated state land under various titles for private, corporate or state 
use, especially though to rectify colonial policies and grant access to land for the rural 
peasantry.
5
  
                                                 
4
 For more comprehensive reviews of land laws, see NEHRP 2004a, b: CPA 2003, 2005a; Bastian 1995. 
5
 Sources: Bastian 1995, Brow and Weeramunda 1992, Farmer 1957, Herring 1983, Moore 1985, Peiris 
1996, Singh 1989. 
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Legislative framework 
The legislative framework on land use policies and property rights has ensured that the 
(central) state authorities have maintained core powers on alienating state land to private 
users for both, residential and agricultural purposes.  
The Land Development Ordinance (LDO) of 1935 enacted the policy of land alienation 
to the rural poor and made provisions for land use plans. Land alienated under the LDO 
was given first as a permit for an initial stage. This permit could then be transferred and a 
grant issued, which was subject to specific conditions for the title holder, including 
limitations on transferring ownership. Overall, the state has kept a strong power on land 
rights, giving the Government Agent power to cancel the permit if land is not properly 
used. The LDO has been complemented by other ordinances regulating land allocations 
for other than agricultural purposes (State (Crown) Lands Ordinance 1947) and for 
alienating land vested in the state after the Land Reform in 1975 (Land Grants (Special 
Provisions) Act 1979). In addition, the state was able to acquire private land for public 
purposes through the Land Acquisition Act No. 9 of 1950. 
The Mahaweli Authority Act makes provisions for the authority to declare any area as a 
Mahaweli area and this will vest all powers to administer land in the Mahaweli Authority 
of Sri Lanka in the so gazetted areas. Similar powers can be vested to the Urban 
Development Authority (UDA) under the Urban Development Authority Act No. 41 of 
1978 to declare any area as urban area, which vests all areas gazetted so under the UDA. 
Similar provisions hold for the Board of Investment (BOI). 
 
14. Land use policies of the central government authorities in post-independence Sri 
Lanka have been influenced by three broad policy concerns, which required that central 
government authorities retain control over land vis-à-vis land users and vis-à-vis local 
government authorities: 
(i) Land productivity, viable production units and food self-sufficiency: 
Agricultural policies in Sri Lanka have for a long time focused on small-
holder agriculture as a response of its neglect during colonial times. This 
policy is reflected in the Paddy Lands Acts, the Land Reform of the 1970s and 
various land alienation schemes for village expansion and agricultural 
colonization. In the last years, recognition is growing that small-holder 
agriculture has not been a viable means to eradicate rural poverty, especially 
due to increasing land fragmentation, which has kept many small-holders in 
poverty. A new policy approach seeking to make (agricultural) land use more 
productive is reflected in the formulation of a National Land Use Policy, the 
World Bank supported Land Titling Project and other attempts to liberalize 
rural land markets to achieve a consolidation of land parcel sizes.  
(ii) Land use policy and poverty alleviation: After independence, agricultural 
policies needed to address the problem of increasing land scarcity in the 
densely populated wet zones and the resulting impoverishment of rural 
peasants in these areas. Colonization of the sparsely populated dry zone was 
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considered a means to provide new land to these peasants to overcome 
landlessness and to prevent social upheaval by an impoverished rural 
population.  
(iii) Land use and territorial control: Land colonization in the dry zone has 
become intimately linked with the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka. The Tamil 
minority has perceived land colonization in the North and East as an 
encroachment of Sinhalese settlers into their traditional homeland. Sinhalese 
politicians have considered land colonization as a necessary instrument to 
overcome rural landlessness in the wetland areas and as a reinvigoration of 
past Sinhalese-Buddhist hydraulic civilization. Ethnicity has gathered 
momentum as a means to assert rival claims to state controlled resources, 
including land. Since the 1950s onwards, Tamil and Muslim politicians 
became concerned about what they considered ethnically disproportionate 
benefits of land colonization scheme and resulting ethnic composition of 
settlers have become a politically sensitive issue since the 1950s.  
 
ETHNICIZATION AND POLITICIZATION OF LAND ISSUES 
15. The ethnicization and politicization of land related issues is closely linked with 
the history of land policies and land colonization in the North and East. Land 
colonization schemes in the dry zone have been controversial in Sri Lankan politics since 
independence and have become one of the grievance issues of the Tamil as well as the 
Muslim minorities. The centrality of this issue is shown in the fact that control over state 
land has figured as key issue in all negotiations between Tamil representatives and 
successive Sri Lankan governments since the 1950s and land will also be one of the core 
issues in future negotiations between the conflict parties. The principal demand of Tamil 
representatives has been for land in the Northeast Province to be vested with provincial 
bodies having autonomous powers independent of the Central Government. 
16. The specific concern of the Tamil minority constituency has been that state 
sponsored colonization would change the demographic characteristics in the North and 
East, in particular ethnic population ratios. Tables 2 and 3 compile changes in ethnic 
population ratios in the districts of the North and East from 1911 to 1981. The data shows 
that the relative proportion of Sinhalese population has increased significantly in 
Trincomalee and Batticaloa/Amparai districts, though part of this increase took place 
prior to independence (1948). The relative increase in Sinhalese population, notable in 
Trincomalee, is not only related to colonization schemes, but Sinhalese also migrated to 
Trincomalee town for work in ports and other development areas.
6
 Overall, the 
controversy over past land colonization policies has been differently received in the three 
ethnic constituencies:
 7
 
 
                                                 
6
 Source: Peiris 1991, 1996. 
7
 These “perceptions” represent the dominating discourse within each ethnic constituency. Needless to say 
that of course, there are also differing opinions within one ethnic constituency; however, the ones 
considered here are those which have become politically relevant in the post-conflict transition process, 
especially for the peace negotiations. 
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 Sinhalese representatives tend to argue that dry zone colonization is a necessity as 
a means to overcome widespread rural impoverishment in the wet zone and that it 
would not be justifiable to leave large tracts of unutilized land in the dry zone 
without proper economic use. Furthermore, it is asserted that land colonization 
schemes did not displace Tamil or Muslim residents, but largely were located in 
formerly uninhabited areas or in areas settled by Sinhalese. Sinhalese settlements 
in the East are reportedly of very ancient origin (6-10 Century BC) and land 
colonization was considered by some Sinhalese representatives as a return to land, 
which they occupied in those ancient hydraulic civilizations and a rectification of 
past colonial injustices.
8
 
 Tamil representatives were particularly concerned about the change in ethnic 
population ratios in several districts of the North and East as a result of 
colonization, which, in their view, favored Sinhalese settlers disproportionately at 
the expense of Tamils and Muslims. This applies for the Gal Oya scheme in 
Amparai, the Kantalai tank in Trincomalee and parts of the Mahaweli scheme in 
Trincomalee and Batticaloa, where a majority of settlers has been Sinhalese. 
Coupled with this was the concern about redrawing of administrative and 
electoral boundaries in the East, which was expected to weaken Tamil 
representation in parliament.
9
 
 Muslim representatives in the East largely share grievances of Tamil 
representatives with regard to past land colonization and feel discriminated in 
land alienation of these settlement schemes. However, in the national policy 
debates, Muslim politicians have not played a major role until the mid 1990s and 
their grievances have been less noted due to the dominating Sinhalese-Tamil 
dichotomy. 
                                                 
8
 Sources: Peiris 1991, 1996, Silva 1998. 
9
 Sources: e.g. Balasundarampillai 2002; Manogaran 1987; Tambiah 1986; Wilson 2000. 
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Table 2: Ethnic composition in the North and East (percent) 
 Sinhalese Sri Lankan Tamil Indian Tamil Muslim 
 1911 1946 1981 1911 1946 1981 1911 1946 1981 1911 1946 1981 
Jaffna 0.1 1.1 0.6 98.3 96.3 95.3 0.3 1.0 2.4 1.0 1.2 1.7 
Mannar 2.7 3.8 8.1 64.6 51.0 50.6 6.3 11.2 13.2 33.2 30.1 26.6 
Vavuniya/ 
Mullaitivu* 
10.7 16.6 11.4 77.7 69.3 65.4 3.4 4.2 16.9 7.0 8.7 6.0 
Trincomalee 3.8 20.7 33.6 56.8 40.1 33.8 1.1 4.4 2.6 32.0 29.2 29.0 
Batticaloa/ 
Amparai* 
3.7 5.8 21.8 54.2 49.7 43.4 0.4 0.6 0.7 39.2 42.0 33.5 
North and East 1.8 4.9 13.2 81.6 75.5 65.1 0.7 1.7 3.6 14.9 16.4 17.6 
Source: Kearney and Miller (1987), calculated from Department of Census and Statistics, various 
years. Note that the 2001 Population census was not being conducted in most districts of the North 
and parts of the districts of the East. 
*Amparai and Mullaitivu have been carved out as separate districts after independence.  
 
Table 3: Ethnic composition of Batticaloa and  
Amparai district populations (percent) 
 
 Batticaloa Amparai 
1963 1981 1963 1981 
Sinhalese 3.4 3.2 29.3 37.3 
Sri Lanka Tamils 71.3 70.8 23.2 20.1 
Indian Tamils 0.9 1.2 0.6 0.4 
Muslims 23.4 24.0 46.3 41.5 
Source: see Table 2 
 
17. A number of studies have underlined the link between land colonization and 
increasing ethnic grievances in the North and East.
10
 Donor agencies have also become 
more critical about their own involvement in financing such schemes, in particular in the 
case of Mahaweli.
11
 Grievances related to land colonization overshadow many land-
related disputes and conflicts to the present day and land disputes in the North and East in 
the current (semi-) post-conflict and post-tsunami situation need to be understood in the 
context of this historical legacy of disputed claims to territories and control over state 
land in the North and East. 
                                                 
10
 Sources: Bastian 1995; Klingebiel and Rösel 1998; Manogaran 1987; Peebles 1990; Shastri 1990; 
Spencer 1990; Tambiah 1986. 
11
 Bush 2001; Klingebiel and Rösel 1998; Gillies 1992; Mallick 1998; Uphoff 1992. 
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Devolution of powers 
The 13
th
 Amendment to the Constitution was introduced in 1987 in an attempt to devolve 
and delegate certain powers of the government to the provincial councils. This was seen 
as an important step to accommodate concerns of Tamil and Muslim politicians for 
ensuring a larger control of provincial authorities over land use policies in the North and 
East. The 13
th
 amendment has not yet been effective in decentralizing powers over land 
alienation. The amendment categorizes subjects as Provincial Council List, Reserved List 
and Concurrent List subjects, falling under the purview of the Provincial Council, the 
Central Government and both respectively. However, the government keeps overriding 
powers over provincial councils in all matters. Rights in or over land, land tenure, 
transfer and alienation, land use, land settlement and land improvement fall under the 
purview of the Provincial Council, however, all state land continues to vest in the 
Republic and the Provincial Council can only alienate land under the seal of the 
President. Furthermore, land alienated under inter-provincial irrigation and colonization 
schemes remain under the purview of the Central Government. Furthermore, the 
government has alienated large tracts of state land in the Northeast Province to central 
government agencies, such as the Ports Authorities, which are outside of the 
administrative control of the provincial council. 
The National Land Commission envisaged in the 13
th
 amendment has not been appointed 
leaving many responsibilities unclear between Central Government and Provincial 
Councils. Since 1990, the Northeast Provincial Council (NEPC) has no elected Council, 
and subsequently, the Governor who is appointed by the President holds wide-ranging 
powers. Control over finances and staff continue to depend on decisions of the central 
government, which makes the 13
th
 amendment in large parts of land administration in the 
North and East ineffective. In addition, the administrative capacities of Provincial Land 
Commissioner and Divisional Secretariats have been weakened during the ethnic conflict 
due to acute staff shortage.
12
 
 
                                                 
12
 Sources: Bastian 1995, CPA 2003, 2005, NEHRP 2004a, 2004b, UNHCR 2003. 
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IMPACT OF ARMED CONFLICT ON LAND 
 
19. The extent of human suffering caused by the conflict has been very high and 
includes loss of lives, physical injuries and disabilities, displacement and loss of means of 
livelihood through the destruction of the physical infrastructure and productive assets in 
the affected provinces. It is estimated that over 65,000 people have lost their lives and 
double that number have been disabled due to the war. UNHCR estimates that approx. 
900,000 people have been displaced due to armed conflict, of which 380,000 have 
returned since the ceasefire agreement.
13
 According to a Comprehensive Needs 
Assessment Survey carried out in 2003, a total of 326,000 houses have been fully or 
partially damaged (World Bank, 2004b). While it has not been possible to carry out 
comprehensive household surveys in the Northeast during the conflict, it is likely that the 
poverty conditions in these regions are far more severe than in other parts of the country 
(World Bank, 2003a). The loss of economic assets due to displacement and conflict is 
colossal and in many parts of the CAA the population needs to restart their livelihoods 
from scratch (Centre for Policy Alternatives, 2003).  
 
DYNAMICS OF THE ARMED CONFLICT 
20. The dynamics of the armed conflict have differed geographically: while in the 
North, military contestation after 1995 took place along clearly defined fortified lines, the 
East was affected by more guerrilla type contestation with changing boundaries of 
military control between the two conflict parties. In the North, Jaffna peninsula has been 
heavily contested in military terms, especially after 1995 until the Sri Lankan armed 
forces regained control over large parts of Jaffna in 1996. In these militarily contested 
areas, large tracts of land are mined, destruction is severe, also in the urban outskirts of 
Jaffna. In the East, the spheres of control in the East differed during day and night with 
the army controlling the major towns and roads during the day and the LTTE being in 
control of large parts of Trincomalee and Batticaloa during the night. Rural areas have 
been the main area of military contestation with the LTTE staging military attacks from 
their basis in the interior spaces under its control. Urban areas have been largely under 
control of the Sri Lankan armed forces, though the LTTE used to extract taxes from the 
population in the night. The East had also been a theatre of inter-ethnic violence on 
community level between Tamils and Muslims as well as Tamils and Sinhalese creating 
deep-rooted suspicion and resentment between the three ethnic groups.
14
 
These military dynamics have had implications for changes in land use, land rights and 
land access for the North and East respectively. In the North, the major challenge is the 
large-scale displacement of people from Jaffna and the ways how to deal with return of 
displaced after the ceasefire agreement. In the East, a major concern is related to 
agricultural production, which was restricted in some areas due to limited access to 
cultivation land, especially those lands located in highly disputed areas. Also, the multi-
ethnic settlement patterns of the East have been vulnerable to inter-ethnic tensions and 
                                                 
13
 UNHCR: Statistical Summary as at 28 February 2005. 
14
 Sources: Goodhand et al. 1999, 2000. 
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violence after the ceasefire, since livelihoods of different ethnic groups are closely linked, 
especially those of Tamils and Muslims.
15
 
 
DECLINE IN AGRICULTURAL LAND USE 
21. The regional economy in the North and East is largely agriculture based and land 
use plays a major role in the economic recovery process. The majority of the population 
in the conflict-affected North and East derives their livelihoods from agriculture and 
fishing. On average agricultural activities contribute to almost 40% of the total income of 
rural households in the North and East with rice being the dominant crop accounting for 
44% of the cultivated area whereas higher value crops, such as fruits and vegetables, are 
only of minor importance. In comparison, agriculture contributes in average only 8% to 
the incomes of rural households in the Western province and 22% to the incomes of rural 
households in the Central provinces (World Bank, 2003b). 
 
Table 3: Change of Extent Under Agriculture by District in the Northeast – 2002, 1982 
District Extent under Agriculture (Hectares) 
 2002 [Ha] 1982 [Ha] Difference  
1982-2002 [Ha] 
Difference  
1982-2002 [%] 
Jaffna 
Kilinochchi 
16,876 
15,129 
} 49,204 } -17,199 } -35.0 
Mannar 8,791 18,484 -9,693 -52.4 
Vavuniya 13,567 27,773 -14,206 -51.1 
Mullativu 16,089 19,170 -3,081 -16.1 
Batticaloa 33,165 50,886 -17,721 -34.8 
Ampara 72,023 62,641 9,382 15.0 
Trincomalee 22,220 41,597 -19,377 -46.6 
NORTH 70,452 114,631 -44,179 -38.5 
EAST 127,408 155,124 -27,716 -17.9 
NORTHEAST 197,860 269,755 -71895 -26.6 
Anuradhapura 147,894 113,590 34,304 30.2 
Polonnaruwa 69,367 53,396 15,971 29.9 
NORTH CENTRAL 217,261 166,986 50,275 30.1 
Sri Lanka 1,916,210 1,973,840 -57,629 -2.9 
Source: Agricultural Census 2002, Department of Census and Statistics 
 
                                                 
15
 Sources: Korf et al. 2001; Korf 2004, 2005, McGilvray 2003, Thangarajah 2003. 
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22. The civil war has heavily affected agricultural production in the CAA. In many 
areas, access to land and livelihood resources have become restricted or insecure due to 
the politico-military dynamics of the civil war. Agricultural producers have lost revenues 
and productive assets such as tractors, livestock, seeds, fertilizers etc. The impacts of the 
ethnic conflict on land use can only be estimated. Table 3 shows government statistics on 
the changes in the extent of land under agricultural use in the Northeast Province (NEP) 
in comparison to the North-Central Province (NCP). Both provinces belong to the dry 
zone and have been colonized in state-supported settlement schemes, such as the 
Mahaweli. The data illustrates the dramatic decline in land under agricultural use 
throughout the North and East with the exception of Amparai district since 1982. In 
contrast, agricultural land use has significantly increased in other rural districts of the dry 
zone outside of the NEP, as the numbers for the NCP indicate. In the NCP, agricultural 
land use has risen by 30% from 1982 to 2002, while it has decline by 26.6% in the NEP 
(and by 38.5% in the Northern districts).  
23. This dramatic decline in agricultural land use in the North and East is therefore a 
result of the dynamics of the armed conflict. It can be related to population movement 
due to military escalation in specific areas (displacement) or to restricted spatial access to 
livelihood resources and political uncertainty limiting the economic life perspectives in 
the North and East during the armed conflict: 
Displacement: One of the most significant effect has been population displacement, 
which left large areas of the North and East vacated and dilapidated. UNHCR estimates a 
total of 882,601 persons having been permanently displaced during the armed conflict.
16
 
This number includes internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees abroad (India, 
other countries). In addition to these permanent displaced, a lot of temporary 
displacement of people living in the North and East took place due to military 
contestation and/or communal violence between ethnic groups. The latter became 
displaced during increasing military contestation, but returned as soon as the military 
confrontation eased and political tensions reduced. Many of these people have been 
displaced several times since 1983. 
Restricted (physical) access to land: Many people remaining or returning to their places 
of home in the North and East faced and partly continue to face severe access problems to 
their agricultural land.  
a. Security forces occupy large tracts of agricultural and residential land for their 
military purposes for buildings, camps and fortifications. This problem is 
particularly notable in Jaffna peninsula, but not confined to Jaffna alone. Similar 
issues apply for the LTTE’s high security zone. 
b. The LTTE restricted access for Muslims to fields located in the uncleared areas, 
especially in Batticaloa and Muttur. Similarly, the LTTE acquired land for their 
camps and fortifications. 
c. Paddy fields were often located in remoter places away from settlements, which 
made them insecure, so that farmers were reluctant to access their fields and 
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 UNHCR: Statistical Summary as of 28 February 2005. 
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practice cultivation. This applies for farmers from all three ethnic groups, 
depending on the specific location. 
d. Poor people often use common-pool resources, such as forests and lagoons for 
livelihood activities, such as hunting and gathering, firewood collection etc. 
When jungle and lagoons became militarily disputed, civilians were reluctant to 
continue using these resources (such decline in land use is not reflected in the 
statistics, since statistics do not account for this kind of informal land use). This 
particularly affects the very poor, such as widows and landless households. 
e. Landmines have been a constant threat for people to return to their places of 
origin or to continue cultivation, especially in the Jaffna peninsula. 
Political instability and inter-ethnic tensions, especially in the East, discouraged some 
farmers to continue cultivation during the ongoing armed conflict. For example, 
Sinhalese farmers in border villages were reluctant to cultivate remotely situated paddy 
fields. Muslim cultivators, whose fields are located side-by-side with Tamil fields in 
mixed Tamil-Muslim areas, would not dare to go to their fields in times of inter-ethnic 
tension. Tamil farmers were not given access to their fields by security forces or their 
fields were located in militarily contested areas. During times of ethnic tensions, farmers 
whose fields were located in areas dominated by another ethnic group often sold their 
land to unfavorable conditions, landlords did not dare to collect their rent or tenants did 
not bother to pay their rents. The latter particularly happened in the Tamil-Muslim 
inhabited areas of the East, where Tamils and Muslim settlement are situated close to 
each other and where livelihoods depended on mutual cooperation in the past. In effect, 
these processes have created ethnically more homogenous spatial entities and grievances 
among those who had to leave
17
. 
Lack of economic opportunities: Some farmers have abandoned cultivation due to lack of 
incentives to produce. The extent of the impact of declining economic opportunities and 
incentives has not been systematically studied yet and it can be expected that the situation 
differs considerably across the North and East. Discouraging frame conditions for 
agricultural production include limited or no availability of inputs, restricted marketing 
opportunities, taxation by militants, restricted mobility through the established 
checkpoint system and the problems of transporting some goods into or out of uncleared 
areas or into areas which were highly disputed (even though not officially declared 
"uncleared"). On the other hand, some studies also indicate that some farmers have 
continued agricultural production even under adverse conditions; in some circumstances, 
substantial investments in agriculture have been done in politically unstable areas, where 
marketing opportunities and access to inputs were given.
18
 There are cases where farmers 
have opportunistically overexploited soils using high value crops, such as onions, to 
make quick gains in view of an uncertain future.
19
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 Source: Hasbullah et al. 2005. 
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 Source: Korf et al. 2001. 
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 Source: Korf et al. 2001. 
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LAND USE AND POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION 
 
24. The signing of the ceasefire agreement (CFA) in February 2002 has created 
prospects for reconstruction and development in the North and East. These new political 
and economic dynamics have also affected land tenure security and land access in the 
North and East. In the three years since the signing of the ceasefire agreement, a number 
of land-related disputes and grievances have emerged. One needs to distinguish those 
issues which originate from new opportunities and constraints after the CFA (i) and more 
protracted land disputes, which have been pending during the armed conflict and whose 
nature has been altered due to the changing political constellations after the CFA (ii). The 
ceasefire agreement has provided freedom of movements and has offered opportunities 
for displaced persons and absentee landlords to make claims for their properties. Many 
people who had left their property and homes during times of war are now returning to 
their original place and are claiming their belongings or are demanding assistance from 
the government. When returning, many of them are not able to access or claim their 
property and land. In addition, rural households use this freedom to restart traditional and 
new livelihood activities for which they require access to common-pool resources, such 
as jungle and lagoon resources. 
In this situation, dormant land disputes that had been suppressed during the armed 
conflict now emerge to the open with new political power dynamics developing in the 
North and East. Many of these conflicts have their roots in structural issues (e.g. land 
scarcity), but become reinterpreted in ethnic terms and politically linked with the broader 
ethnic conflict. A number of inter-communal (inter-ethnic) disputes have emerged after 
the CFA which have the potential to trigger inter-ethnic violence and/or which have been 
subject to ethnic and political manipulation. These issues differ regarding extent, 
intensity and scale between different regions and localities in the North and East 
 
LAND ISSUES AFTER THE CEASEFIRE AGREEMENT 
25. The legacies of the armed conflict continue to influence land tenure security and 
land access in the North and East even after the ceasefire agreement - they affect the 
ability of displaced persons to return, limit the prospects for reviving local livelihoods 
and create potential constraints to post-conflict reconstruction: 
i. Land tenure insecurity has significantly increased: During the ongoing armed 
conflict, due to the overall political instability and prevailing insecurity, land 
users could never be sure that they would be able to claim their rights to land in 
the future. Displaced persons often lost their title documents. Many farmers in the 
North and East only had temporary permits on state land, which can be cancelled 
by the respective Government Agent. In some circumstances, persons from 
another ethnic group made opportunistic use of the current political conditions 
and occupied property of a person from another ethnic group, when the political 
situation was conducive to do so.  
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ii. Land access has been restricted in many places: The political instability, military 
contestation and territorial politics produced conditions, which made large tracts 
of land under agricultural or other use inaccessible for civilians. Many farmers 
lost important assets and agricultural implements to make productive use of their 
land. Access to common-pool resources was often denied or people were reluctant 
to make use of them due to precarious security conditions, since most of the 
common-pool resources were arenas of military contestation. Even after the 
ceasefire agreement, many of these access-related problems are not yet solved 
(high- security zones, land mines etc.). 
26. Land administration in the North and East continues to be ineffective and prone to 
political interferences. The implementation of land use policies and land management in 
the North and East is still hampered by a lack of administrative capacity in the hands of 
the provincial council administration, the reluctance of administrators to become 
involved in land disputes, which had an inter-ethnic dimension and the influence of 
political favoritism in administrative decisions, which often means ethnic favoritism. This 
situation paralyzes land management in the North and East even after the ceasefire 
agreement and creates serious repercussions for the perception of land holders about the 
accountability and effectiveness of land administration. The LTTE has established a 
separate system of police and courts in the area under their control. The Eelam courts 
work together with the Tamil Eelam Police to enforce LTTE laws. In the uncleared areas 
of the East, both courts administered by the Government of Sri Lanka and the courts 
administered by the LTTE operate. This situation creates confusion amongst civilians 
regarding the effectiveness, applicability and validity of the judicial system.
20
 In effect, 
this situation contributes to persisting land tenure insecurity and insecure access to land 
for rural households.  
27. Since the late 1990’s the Government of Sri Lanka has been piloting approaches 
to introduce land title registration in limited locations outside of the conflict affected 
regions.  The advantages of a title registration system over the existing deeds registration 
system are as follows.  The deeds registration system is based on registering legal 
documents, such as contracts of sales, and has weak, if any, mechanisms for ensuring 
consistency among these registered documents for a particular land parcel.  Therefore, it 
is possible to have multiple deeds registered against a single property which are mutually 
contradictory.  The title registration system is based on the land parcel itself.  Each land 
parcel is identified by a unique number and rights registered against that property are 
tracked in a single title registry entry for that parcel.  Furthermore, the State guarantees 
the information in the title registry as being conclusive and is obliged to indemnify 
parties that suffer as a result of unreliable information.  While the land titling program 
has thus far been piloted on a small scale outside of the conflict affected regions, the 
successful implementation of this program in the North and East of the country could be 
an important instrument for addressing the identified conflict related land issues. 
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TYPOLOGY OF LAND-RELATED CONFLICTS AFTER THE CFA 
27. In order to analyze the convoluted situation of land disputes after the CFA, this 
report suggests to differentiate three types of land conflicts. This differentiation is 
necessary to separate out the structural causes of land disputes from their link with the 
political dynamics of the ethnic conflict. Three types or levels of land issues are 
distinguished: 
i. Inter-individual land disputes and property rights issues (individual-individual, 
individual-state) which remain intra-ethnic and where there is no inter-ethnic 
dimension involved.  
ii. Inter-communal and inter-individual land disputes and property rights issues 
(individual-individual, individual-communal, communal-communal) with an 
inter-ethnic dimension involved. 
iii. Inter-individual and inter-communal land disputes and property rights issues 
(individual-state, communal-communal, communal-state, conflict parties) where 
the inter-ethnic dimension has become dominant. These issues are highly 
politicized and considered as core fundamental grievances of one or more of the 
conflict parties. 
28. In order to differentiate and scrutinize the three types of conflicts, two analytical 
categories are proposed which are essential for understanding the link between land and 
rural livelihoods: land tenure security and land access.  
i. Land tenure security addresses issues of land and property rights, perceived 
security of these rights among right holders, problem of loss of documents, 
impacts of conflict on land transactions, land disputes arising from resettlement 
and reconstruction, especially in the housing sector.  
ii. Land access analyses the link between access of vulnerable groups to land and 
their livelihood opportunities. It looks at the impact of the conflict and the 
tsunami on livelihood assets (e.g. loss of property) and how the conflict has 
affected access (and informal rights) of these groups to their land-related 
livelihood resources (such as agricultural land, common pool resources, e.g. 
forests).  
Governance issues are important for both land tenure security and land access. They 
entail the policy framework, including formal legislation and traditional laws, as well as 
the enforcement mechanisms of such laws. The enforcement mechanisms are crucial, 
since they define the practical implementation of laws. Enforcement mechanisms include 
land administration (e.g. title registration, title alienation), informal or customary 
mechanisms for resource access and the involvement of other actors which may 
influence, legally or illegally, the implementation of land laws and related policy 
frameworks. 
Table 4 enumerates the various land-related issues relating to Level 1-3 types and 
distinguishes land tenure and property rights, land access and governance issues. The 
category “Land tenure and property rights” relates to disputed claims for user rights to 
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land (or property), whereas “land access” entails physical and spatial access to land for 
livelihood purposes which may be restricted due to political insecurity after the ceasefire 
agreement. Both categories are related to “governance issues”, which look into questions 
of land administration, land alienation and political interferences in these. Annex 1 
provides detailed elaboration and the data sources for each of the listed issues.  
29. The boundaries between the three levels of land issues can be fluid, in particular 
when we look at Level 2 and Level 3. Some issues elaborated as Level (2) type conflicts 
may become politicized to an extent that they need to be categorized as Level (3) type 
conflicts. For example, inter-ethnic disputes over land resources, which have structural 
roots in increasing land scarcity, can become subject to political and ethnic manipulation 
and then a source of inter-ethnic grievances, which go out of hand or which are used by 
political spoilers to steer inter-ethnic resentment. Examples could be Sinhalese 
grievances about inaccessible land controlled by the LTTE or Tamil-Muslim grievances 
over land access, or disputes over religious structures.  
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Table 4: Three Levels of Land Disputes and Related Governance Issues 
Level 1 type Level 2 type Level 3 type 
Inter-individual land disputes and 
property rights issues; 
no inter-ethnic dimension 
involved. 
Inter-communal and inter-
individual land conflicts; 
inter-ethnic dimension involved. 
Highly politicized issues 
(individual-state, communal-
communal, communal-state, 
conflict parties); 
Inter-ethnic dimension dominant. 
Land tenure and property rights: 
1. Disputed occupation of land 
(secondary occupants, 
encroachment of abandoned 
land), 
2. Disputed titles. False titles, 
illegal alienation of land 
(“Japan” deed), 
3. Transfer under duress or 
forcible fraudulent transfers, 
4. Unclear property rights and 
occupation of temple lands, 
5. Boundary disputes, 
6. Loss, destruction of title 
documents, 
7. Gender issues (e.g. legislation 
discriminating against women, 
traditional laws). 
Land tenure and property rights: 
1. Inter-ethnic disputes over water 
allocation and land access in 
irrigation schemes, 
2. Inter-ethnic disputes over 
competing land uses, 
3. Disputes over fishing landing 
rights, 
4. Inter-ethnic land transfers during 
the armed conflict, 
5. Land disputes between returnees 
and secondary occupants being 
from different groups, 
 
 
Land tenure and property rights: 
1. Sinhalese encroachment close to 
military camps, 
2. Inter-ethnic transfers of land and 
property, in particular in and 
around Trincomalee, 
 
Land access: 
8. Landlessness among IDPs and 
refugees (e.g. second 
generation), 
9. Land mines and unexploded 
ordinances  makes access to 
land and property dangerous, 
10. Access problems to 
common-pool resources (e.g. 
jungle, lagoon) due to 
insecurity. 
Land access: 
6. Restricted land access in inter-
ethnic areas due to political 
insecurity and fear. 
 
 
Land access: 
3. Land inaccessible for Tamil 
farmers located in high security 
zones and land or property 
occupied by military, 
4. Land inaccessible for Muslims in 
LTTE controlled areas, 
5. Land inaccessible for Sinhalese 
located in or close to LTTE 
controlled areas (border 
villages). 
 
Governance issues: 
12. Existing laws creating 
impediments in obtaining re-
possession from long-term 
occupiers, 
13. Encroachment on state 
land, sometimes supported by 
political or militant groups, 
14. Existence of parallel court 
system established by LTTE 
can create confusion due to 
plural institutions in charge for 
land issues. 
Governance issues: 
7. Disputes over religious symbols 
and their territorial implications, 
8. Resentment towards increasing 
power and influence of 
politicians in ethnically biased 
allocation of state land, 
9. Biased or ineffective 
administrative rulings on inter-
ethnic land rights disputes. 
 
Governance issues: 
6. Land in the North and East 
alienated to government 
corporative bodies, 
7. Devolution and administrative 
powers over land administration, 
8. Boundary redrawing of districts 
and divisional secretariats 
according to ethnic lines, 
9. Militarization of administration 
in some parts of the North and 
East, 
10. Strategic settlements in the 
North and East established 
during the 1980s. 
Source: own categorization and compilation from various data sources. Detailed explanations and 
references are provided in Annex 1. 
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30. Encroachment on state land has been an issue of much concern in the North and 
East (as it has in other places of Sri Lanka). A Government Circular issued by the 
National Land Commissioner requests relevant authorities not to regularize any 
encroachments that took place after the 15 June 1995. Part of the encroachment, often 
labeled “genuine” encroachment arises from the need of growing families to give land to 
their children or from displaced persons to find some place to stay. In other cases, 
encroachment has been politically supported by often unidentified forces, with the help or 
silent consent of Army and Police or the LTTE.
21
 Or militant groups have illegally 
alienated land to IDPs, for example in Vavuniya. If such encroachment raises issues of 
inter-ethnic concern, they are to be classified under Level (3) types of issues, since their 
resolution needs to be incorporated into a broad political settlement. 
31. Depending on different use types of land, the specificities of property rights to 
land may also differ. In addition to private ownership rights, there are a number of user 
rights without full ownership rights. User rights can be formal, e.g. documented through 
permits or grants issued by government offices and they may be informal, such as 
customary rights to use common-pool resources (forests, lagoons etc.). In addition, there 
can be other types of “rights” or perceived rights, such as illegal occupation of state land, 
encroachment of forests, and encroachment of private ownership. Some of these land 
uses can be considered as rights if their legitimacy is based on specific rules, others may 
be illegal and may require intervention by the state (Table 5). 
 
Table 5: Characteristics of Various Tenure Rights 
Land Rights Ownership Rights User Rights 
Formal Inherited or purchased or government 
transfers with title deeds  
– mainly urban and plantation. 
 
Largely legal time bound agreements such 
as lease holdings  
– mainly urban 
Surveyed and mapped. Long-term lease of land such as in 
colonization schemes  
– mainly rural 
Informal Traditionally inherited, largely 
unsurveyed and without legal documents  
– mainly rural 
 
Traditional land sharing, theoretically 
legally binding, such as ande, thattumaru 
and kattimaru 
– totally rural 
 
Access to common property – both urban and rural 
 
Other “rights” Illegal use of public land – squatting on urban public land; encroached forests for 
agricultural purposes; informal “sharing” of common property land such as for free 
grazing. 
Source: IPS (2004) 
                                                 
21
 Source: UNHCR 2003. 
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32. The specific forms of ownership and user rights and the complex legal 
specifications of different titles create further confusion and prospects for disputing 
claims. These convolutions in user rights are manifest in a number of issues relevant for 
Level 1 and 2 type land conflicts: 
i. The boundaries of state and private land ownership are fuzzy, in particular for the 
case of permit titles, since the state alienates land for private use, but retains some 
powers to control the proper use of it. Such legislative clauses are open to 
interpretation and offer scope for corruptive uses or political interferences, for 
example the possible cancellation of permits. The misuse and other types of 
malpractices and frequent changes in land policies with regard to title 
specifications have contributed to further confusion on the aspect of land 
ownership, both among title holders and the local administrators. 
ii. The responsibilities of different state authorities to alienate state land for different 
uses are often unclear or disputed between central and provincial authorities, 
because central government authorities have vested land in the North and East 
with a number of state agencies which too have conflicting claims over land. 
iii. The land administration system, in particular regarding documentation of titles, is 
complex for both, state and private land. Overlapping administrative 
responsibilities for specific land issues, for example governing agricultural land 
use and water rights in irrigation schemes, further confuses responsibilities for 
land administration and land dispute resolution among different government 
authorities. 
iv. A serious concern after the ceasefire agreement has been that a number of rights 
holders have lost their documents and that parts of the documentation held by the 
state in land registries have been destroyed or damaged. In some cases, illegal 
transfers have been “regularized” by false deeds or other documents. 
33. There is also an ethical dimension in land transactions: although the formal 
dealing of land transfers may have been legal, some land transfers have been done out of 
a situation of distress by the seller and created conditions favouring the buyer of the land. 
Such allegations are often brought forward by the various ethnic groups.  
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LAND USE AND POST-TSUNAMI RECOVERY 
 
34. The Indian Ocean tsunami on 26 December 2004 has affected the conflict-
affected areas of Sri Lanka with particular gravity. It displaced some 430,000 people and 
left more than 100,000 homeless/landless. Around 70% of the affected areas are within 
the conflict-affected areas, placing an additional burden to this already affected zone. The 
overall damage is estimated to be around 1 billion US $ (4.5% of the GDP). The 
percentage of population affected was highest in the Amparai and Mullaitivu districts 
with concentrations of Tamil and Muslim populations respectively. The Batticaloa and 
Amparai districts alone account for 43% of the affected population island-wide.
22
 In these 
areas, the tsunami affected people were already highly vulnerable in social and economic 
terms due to the effects of armed conflict and as a consequence, their resilience to 
respond to the disaster was limited. Some people who were internally displaced due to 
the armed conflict have become displaced again by the tsunami. Coastal Muslims many 
of whom are fishing communities suffered by far the largest casualties as a result of the 
tsunami accounting for 53% of the Tsunami deaths.
23
 
 
Table 6: Districts in the North and East Affected by the Tsunami 
 
District Displaced Persons Deaths Injured Missing Damaged Houses 
In welfare 
centers 
With 
relatives 
Total Completely Partially 
Jaffna 7,635 33,381 41,006 2,640 1,647 540 6,084 1,114 
Kilinochchi 0 1,603 1,603 560 670 0 246 - 
Mullaitivu 8,212 14,390 22,602 3,000 2,590 412 5,033 424 
Trincomalee 13,778 59,208 72,986 1,078 1,328 45 4,830 3,835 
Batticaloa 19,770 35,047 54,817 2,975 2,375 340 12,232 5,376 
Amparai 22,215 77,797 100,012 10,436 6,711 161 17,117 10,574 
Total  
Northeast 
71,600 221,426 293,026 20,689 15,321 1,507 45,542 30,323 
Total 
Sri Lanka 
87,270 424,158 511,428 31,229 23,189 4,093 63,447 43,361 
Source: UNHCR statistics as of May 2005, compiled from District Secretariats of the affected Districts 
(http://unhcr.lk/statistics). 
 
                                                 
22
 Source: Frerks and Klem 2005. 
23
 Source: UNHCR 2005, 12. 
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35. The tsunami has further added to land-related problems in the conflict-affected 
areas of the North and East.
24
 The impacts of the tsunami on rural livelihoods in the 
conflict-affected areas have been dramatic.
25
 The tsunami surge completely destroyed 
around 99,480 homes and partially damaged about 44,290. The completely and partially 
damaged houses together comprise 13 percent of the housing stock in the administrative 
divisions along the coast. The tsunami has displaced more than 500.000 people adding to 
the still unresolved problems of resettlement of persons displaced by the armed conflict.
26
 
The destruction and loss of lives has been highest in the most densely populated areas of 
Amparai and Batticaloa coasts and it is difficult to find alternative housing locations for 
tsunami affected families in these areas, limiting the potential scope for preventive 
policies to deal with future tsunami disasters. In some areas, sea water intrusion and dune 
formation have affected coastal land quality in an already densely populated area with 
high pressure on residential and cultivation land and have contributed to decreasing land 
availability for cultivation.  
 
THE BUFFER ZONE POLICY 
36. Immediately after the tsunami, one core government policy for future disaster 
prevention has been the establishment of a setback area (or a buffer zone) on the coastal 
belt to provide protection against future tsunami events. This policy has involved the 
large-scale relocation of people living in those coastal areas declared as a setback area. 
The government’s policy on this, in particular on the specifications of the setback area 
has changed several times since January 2005 and seems to have been largely abandoned 
by the end of 2005. Originally, the government announced a modification of the rules 
governing land use along the coastal belt of Sri Lanka declaring a 100/200m setback area. 
The Urban Development Authority (UDA) published guidelines
27
 providing rules 
regarding the development of the 1km wide stretch of land from the mean tide line. These 
guidelines defined a setback area or buffer zone which is limited to vegetations, parks, 
ports, fishery harbors and related developments as well as historical monuments and 
archeological sites. This setback area was defined as 100m landwards from the coastal 
line in the western half of the country from Point Pedro to Point Dondra and 200m 
landwards from the coastal line in the eastern half of the country from Point Pedro to 
Point Dondra. The Task Force for Rebuilding the Nation (TAFREN) has specified this 
buffer zone further providing district-based specifications of the 100/200m setback area. 
Reconstruction of damaged or destroyed houses will not be permitted within the 
100/200m setback area. The government’s policy was to provide free of charge a house 
with minimum 500 sq.ft. in close proximity to the original location for those to be 
relocated from the setback area. The LTTE declared a 400m setback area in the eastern 
coastal shores of the Vanni and implements this in areas under its control. 
                                                 
24
 Sources: CPA 2005c, Frerks and Klem 2005, Hasbullah et al. 2005, World Bank et al, (2005).  
25
 Source: World Bank et al. (2005) Sri Lanka 2005 Post-Tsunami Recovery Program. Preliminary Damage 
and Needs Assessment. 
26
 Source: see Table 8. 
27
 These guidelines were published in a Public Notice dated 17 January 2005. These guidelines were 
specified by the newly created Task Force for Rebuilding the Nation (TAFREN) in two separate Public 
Notices issued on 27 February 2005. 
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37. The government's originally rigid proposal on the setback area has created a 
number of land-related concerns in the conflict-affected areas. A strict implementation of 
the original proposals would have implicated a large-scale relocation of tsunami victims, 
which was difficult to implement in some parts of the East, where population densities 
are very high along the coastal belt and alternative (state) land was not available in 
sufficient quantity. In addition, population relocation in multi-ethnic areas touches upon 
the fragile ethnic balances we have referred to above. It became clear that for practical 
reasons a strict enforcement of such policy would not be possible. For example, in the 
East, such enforcement would have required the relocation of considerable parts of major 
cities, such as Batticaloa and Trincomalee. In response to these criticisms, the Sri Lankan 
government has revised its original proposal various times, in particular increasing the 
flexibility of its handling and also revising the overall specifications of the setback areas 
in different localities and seems to have abandoned it overall by the end of 2005. The 
repeated changes in government policies have created a situation of uncertainty and 
confusion among administrators, aid agencies and affected tsunami victims formerly 
living in the declared setback areas.
28
 At the same time, local authorities had to take 
account of possible changes in administrative responsibilities arising from a joint 
mechanism Post-Tsunami Operational Mechanism (P-TOM) between the Sri Lankan 
government and the LTTE for administrating aid funds in the North and East in summer 
2005. Many rules and decisions remained ambiguous even to local government officials 
as a consequence of pending decisions at the centre.
29
  
38. Moreover, the centralized emergency planning after the tsunami has reshuffled 
the delicate balance of administrative responsibilities between central government and 
provincial councils and within the central government:
30
 The government has made use 
of the regulations passed in the Coast Conservation Act No 57 of 1981 as well as the 
powers granted to the Urban Development Authority (UDA) in the Urban Development 
Act No. 41 of 1978 and the Gazette (Extraordinary) No. 223/16 dated 17 December 1982, 
which declares the coastal zone area 1km from the mean high water line as 
"Development Area" falling under the purview of the UDA requiring approval from the 
UDA for any developmental activity in this zone. After the tsunami, the UDA has 
withdrawn powers with regard to this Development Area it had formerly delegated to the 
local authorities by Public Notice dated 31 December 2004. In addition, the government 
has passed an Emergency (Miscellaneous Provisions and Powers) Regulation No. 1 of 
2005 providing police officers or members of the armed forces with powers to order any 
person in or about certain areas, including "the seashore" to remove them from that place 
or to use force to give effect to such order.
31
 Administratively, the coordinating power 
has been vested in newly created authorities attached to the President's office, such as the 
Task Force for Rebuilding the Nation (TAFREN), which is responsible for construction 
of permanent shelter for the displaced of the tsunami from the setback area.  
 
                                                 
28
 Source: CPA 2005b, 2005c, Frerks and Klem 2005, UNHCR 2005. 
29
 Source: Frerks and Klem 2005. 
30
 Sources: CPA 2005c, Frerks and Klem 2005. 
31
 Source: CPA 2005c, Welikala 2005. 
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BUFFER ZONE POLICY AND LAND CONFLICT 
39. Land scarcity and pressure on land is likely to increase in the densely populated 
areas of the East, especially in Amparai, Batticaloa and Kinnyia. The government's 
original relocation policy also implied that reserve land and agricultural land be 
converted into residential land for relocation schemes. This would have been likely to 
increase the pressure for economic use of land by cultivation, livestock grazing and other 
uses with potential for local land disputes. Due to the delicate multi-ethnic composition 
of the population in these areas, land disputes can easily be reinterpreted in ethnic terms 
or used for political purposes. Also, increasing pressure for land may decrease land 
access based on informal user rights which are often important for vulnerable households 
(e.g. firewood collection). Many tsunami victims also lost proof of ownership or land use 
rights both in the books and on the ground (e.g. most land markers and boundaries are 
totally or partially destroyed). For those having lost their documents, similar problems 
apply as compared to conflict-related IDPs losing their property documents.  
40. Table 6 summarizes the major concerns relating to land and conflict that have 
emerged in the post-tsunami recovery phase. Some of these issues are linked with the 
ethnic conflict, for example the concern about relocation and how it may affect “ethnic 
population ratios” in specific localities of the East, but also the fact that some state 
legislation discriminates against women (CPA 2005, UNHCR 2005). Of particular 
concern is the differential treatment of conflict-affected people and tsunami-affected 
people regarding the entitlement to state welfare packages and to state land allocation, 
which may create grievances among those conflict-affected IDPs, who do not benefit 
from the post-tsunami recovery aid and are also not allocated state land in the process.  
The table follows the analytical framework set out above (see Table 4) and differentiates 
three levels of land conflict and three categories (land tenure, land access and 
governance). The table lists issues which have emerged in the post-tsunami recovery 
process as well as enumerates items that may potentially create disputes and inter-ethnic 
tensions in the future. The former largely relates to the government’s buffer zone policy, 
how it may affect land markets and thus land access for poor households and the kind of 
uncertainty the policy process has created. The latter points to the potential ethnic 
sensitivity of some policies, e.g. population relocation in multi-ethnic areas.  
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Table 7: Post-Tsunami Reconstruction and Land Related Issues  
 
Level 1 type Level 2 type Level 3 type 
Inter-individual land disputes and 
property rights issues; 
no inter-ethnic dimension 
involved. 
Inter-communal and inter-
individual land conflicts; 
inter-ethnic dimension involved. 
Highly politicized and ethnicized 
land issues (individual-state, 
communal-communal, communal-
state, conflict parties); 
Inter-ethnic dimension dominant. 
Land tenure and property rights: 
 Government’s conditions for 
acquisition of private land for 
relocation program has long not 
been specified creating 
uncertainty, 
 Loss, destruction of title 
documents in the turmoil of the 
tsunami, 
 Existing state legislation and 
traditional inheritance laws 
discriminating against women. 
  
Land access: 
 Fishing communities feel 
insecure about their future 
livelihood options related to the 
coastal zone and their access to 
land located in the buffer zone. 
 Land mines and unexploded 
ordinances washed away by 
tsunami make access to land 
and property dangerous. 
Land access: 
 Government's policy on 
relocation creates additional 
pressure on scarce resources, 
which may trigger further 
resource-based disputes between 
different communities and their 
competing land uses, potentially 
triggering inter-ethnic disputes. 
 
 
Governance issues: 
 Lack of transparency and 
accountability in beneficiary 
selection for housing relocation, 
 
Governance issues: 
 lack of transparency and 
accountability in the allocation 
of land for relocated families 
creates suspicion of ethnic 
favoritism.  
 differential treatment of tsunami 
affected populations belonging 
to different ethnicities or 
resentment of non-affected 
communities vis-à-vis the large-
scale assistance granted to 
tsunami-affected communities 
from another ethnic group. 
Governance issues: 
 The government’s policy to 
recentralize land acquisition for 
alienating it under the relocation 
program affects the delicate 
question of balance of powers 
between centre and provincial 
authorities, 
 relocation may affect ethnic 
settlement patterns and political 
concerns from different ethnic 
groups may arise in this regard. 
 
Sources: CPA 2005b, 2005c, Frerks and Klem 2005, Steele 2005, UNHCR 2005.  
Own categorization. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
41. Post-conflict and post-Tsunami reconstruction processes need to reflect the 
changes which have taken place during the times of armed conflict and the dynamic shifts 
in land use after the ceasefire agreement. Reconstruction processes are closely linked 
with land use, in particular with regards to housing (re)construction after the armed 
conflict and the Tsunami and livelihood support projects to revive the regional economy 
in the North and East, which relies on agriculture as its backbone. In addition, any 
constitutional and administrative reform as part of reconstruction processes and as part of 
peace building will affect the power balances between central and provincial authorities 
with regard to land administration. 
42. As shown throughout this report, land and conflict in the North and East includes 
a large number of different types and levels of land issues depending on specific 
locations. The research has identified five major trajectories, which define the 
opportunities and constraints for a comprehensive and effective policy framework for 
land access and land tenure security in the North and East after the ceasefire and after the 
Tsunami: 
i. Current and emerging land disputes need to be understood in the context of past 
land policies, which have kept administrative power over land use with central 
government authorities. The ethnicization of some land use policies has been 
mirrored in biased and partial implementation of land access and tenure security 
in the North and East, in particular in state land alienation, in regularization of 
encroachments and in delayed and controversial rulings for land disputes.  
ii. The armed conflict has further aggravated the pressure on land resources and has 
increased ethnic grievances related to land use. Land use has declined 
dramatically due to population displacement, restricted access to land (mines, 
military confrontations) and low economic incentives to invest on land due to the 
prevailing political insecurity. The armed conflict has therefore increased land 
tenure insecurity and reduced access to land, in particular for vulnerable families. 
iii. Although some ethnic tensions are aggravated by land disputes, competing access 
to land and restrictions over land use are often rooted in deeper lying structural 
causes. They are only partly an expression of inter-ethnic grievances that 
deepened during times of armed conflict, but are caused by increasing pressures 
for scarce resources, such as population pressures, bad governance, unfavourable 
social and economic processes as well as political decisions. Since the signing of 
the ceasefire agreement, protracted disputes over land access and use have 
surfaced in the North and East after being suppressed during the armed conflict. 
In addition, new land issues have emerged as a result of the return of displaced 
persons. 
iv. Anecdotal evidence shows that some past policies and the impacts of armed 
conflict have transformed the governance frame of land access and land tenure 
security in the North and East creating ethnicized avenues for land administration 
even on local and regional levels. In this context, citizens, as claimants of rights 
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or applicants for land, have developed a general mistrust vis-à-vis perceived 
partialities of local and regional administrators according to their ethnicity or 
political affiliation.  
v. In more operational terms, key aspects of tenure security include the recognition 
and recording of land-related rights. The Government needs to move forward with 
plans to put in place a parcel-based title registration system, building upon the 
experiences with piloting this activity in recent years.  This will likely be a long-
term undertaking, however.  In the meantime, intermediate options can be 
implemented (communal recognition of property and use rights; improvements in 
the existing deeds registration system, etc.).  
vi. The government’s policy after the Tsunami has added to this general level of 
mistrust vis-à-vis state authorities. The set-up of the buffer zone and the decision 
to relocate houses from within this buffer to more secure places have been taken 
and implemented without adequate participation of the affected population. 
Selection procedures have been prone to political manipulation. Due to the 
sensitive nature of land issues, in particular when relocation of populations in 
multi-ethnic areas is involved, lack of transparency and accountability can 
contribute to perceptions of partiality of state authorities among ethnic minorities.  
43. The analysis of the different levels and types of land issues suggests that, while 
land conflict needs to be placed in the broader political and historical background, many 
land issues in the North and East can be solved prior to a final political resolution of the 
ethnic conflict. This applies in particular for Level 1 type conflicts, where no inter-ethnic 
dimension is involved, and largely to Level 2 type conflicts, where an inter-ethnic 
dimension is involved, but is not dominant. The latter types of conflict are of particular 
concern, since if left unattended, they may become politicized and ethnicized, so that they 
need to be considered as Level 3 type conflict where the inter-ethnic dimension has 
become dominant. In order to avoid such escalation of land issues into inter-ethnic 
grievances, it is important that aid agencies, non-governmental organizations and 
government agencies involved in reconstruction and development work of the conflict-
affected areas, including post-tsunami recovery work, carefully consider the constraints 
and the opportunities of settling land issues in their area of work. 
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POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
44. The core premise of this report is two fold: land issues in Sri Lanka cannot be 
seen in isolation from the ethnic and political conflict and, at the same time, even though 
land conflict is often linked with the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka, a large number of land 
conflicts in the North and East can be resolved prior to a full and national political 
solution to the ethnic situation. Many of these land conflicts ought to be solved as a 
prerequisite for ensuring a sustainable reconstruction and development process in conflict 
and tsunami affected areas in the North and East.  
This report does not provide blue print solutions, but rather aims at contributing to the 
overall debate distinguishing issues that are possible to address through administrative 
and operational decisions from those which are ethnically and/or politically sensitive and 
will be part of negotiations between the conflict parties in the peace process. In this 
context, some policy implications have been identified as described in the section below.  
Tenure Security: 
First, there is a need for an effective land administration system that responds to the 
particular context of a conflict and reconstruction situation. This will certainly entail a 
greater inter and intra-institutional coordination and strengthening the existing 
administrative and operational capacities that were established for normal times and 
standard situations. A core one is related to the ability for dealing with competing claims 
over land and other land-related disputes. It is imperative for the state to provide public 
guarantee of tenure security by establishing, among others, alternative means for 
effective conflict resolution at the local level (e.g. inter-communal mechanisms). 
While the overriding principle for dispute resolution should be subsidiarity, i.e. disputes 
should be solved on the lowest institutional level possible, it is advisable that existing 
national administrative and judicial bodies enhance their capacity for monitoring and 
tackling pending cases (i.e. huge land-related backlog at the national level). Another area 
for improvement is related to the need for fast-track mechanisms that could, for example, 
deal with minor land disputes surrounding residential land, boundary disputes etc.(pls see 
Annex 2, table 8 for details). The principle of subsidiarity has, however, the potential risk 
that dominant local elites capture the decision making power surrounding land-related 
matters. This would have to be mitigated early in the process by establishing the 
necessary checks and balances.  
Another key element for tenure security is the formal recognition of land-related rights by 
the state and third parties. Thus, land title registration plays an important role as part of a 
sound land administration system. In this context, some policy implications are identified. 
First, higher priority needs to be given to land title registration and the Government’s 
current efforts to prepare for a national program for title registration.  Areas that require 
improvement are the legislative basis for registration, institutional arrangements for 
conducting this work, and greater public outreach to inform the population of the benefits 
of the program and to obtain feedback from intended beneficiaries.  Second, given the 
conflict and post Tsunami situations, the title registration system may be more adequate 
to such circumstances. International experience points to the advantages of administrative 
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mechanisms as part of the process of adjudication of rights where disputes or situations of 
unclear rights can be reviewed and resolved in a transparent manner with community 
involvement.  Experience with piloting the title registration system has shown that 
significant amendments to the Registration of Title Act of 1998 will be needed if the 
system is going to be capable of dealing with anything other than the most clear cut cases 
of land tenure rights.  An additional challenge will be to implement it in the conflict 
affected areas. 
Third, and as needed corollary to the first point, well defined, fully equipped and capable 
land-related institutions should be put in place, in order to effectively enforce property 
and land use rights. These are required at the national and local levels and, as we can see 
in Annex 1 and Table 8, within and outside the governmental machinery. Most of such 
institutions need to see their actions as services to be provided at low cost in order to 
guarantee a sustainable land administration system.  Leading edge experience 
internationally points up the potential advantages offered by information technology in 
bringing greater transparency and increased efficiencies in the provision of land 
administration services.  
Land Access: 
Land-related inequities should be addressed as early as possible. There is ample evidence 
that initial land endowment or subsequent redistribution failures that are not root causes 
for conflict could easily aggravate or trigger it. In Sri Lanka, as we have analyzed, initial 
failures, the very strong state-dominant land holding structure in some areas, and the 
subsequent politicization of related issues are determinant for the existing power relations 
and distortionary policies. 
As is the case with tenure security issues, the particular Sri Lankan conflict context calls 
for differentiated and innovative approaches to guarantee access to land, in particular for 
the most vulnerable population. Whatever the approach may be, the ethnic balance should 
be a primary criterion. 
Issues related to access include addressing (and further preventing) conflicts arising from 
displacement and returnees, land mines, female headed households (usually widows), and 
biased state-driven land allocation processes on the one hand. On the other, land conflict 
is usually detrimental to equity and Sri Lanka is not an exception. Competing claims for 
land (e.g. among different ethnic communities), land scarcity, in particular in the conflict 
affected areas and consequent landlessness contribute to exacerbate social tensions and 
the overall conflict situation. An unambiguous policy framework for state land 
distribution, land allocation to returnees, tsunami affected and displaced population, and 
overall access to land is essential. 
46. Governance is a cross-cutting issue for land tenure security and land access. A 
number of legal reforms are currently discussed to make land rights and land use policies 
more effective. These reforms in policy need to trickle down to the practice of land 
administration, especially with regard to land allocation and land rights. The challenges 
in relocation and setback area policies after the tsunami have illustrated the crucial 
importance of establishing rules-in-practice and finding enforcement mechanisms for 
such good governance practices, which are perceived as fair, accountable and effective by 
all involved stakeholders. It is unrealistic to expect immediate improvements in 
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administrative practices, but development agencies, government departments and non-
governmental organizations working on reconstruction and development in the North and 
East need to urge administrators involved in land issues relevant for reconstruction and 
development to follow transparent planning procedures, encourage beneficiary 
involvement and criteria-based decision-making. They may also consider how they can 
strengthen the administrative capacities of governmental agencies involved in land 
allocation and land administration. 
As part of good governance, limiting discretionary bureaucratic behavior is a must. The 
following policy principles could support the Government efforts in the area of land 
administration. 
i. Inclusiveness and fair treatment: all citizens should be treated based on the same 
technical criteria regardless of ethnicity, caste or class.  
ii. Transparency: decisions relating to land rights need to be transparent to all 
affected stakeholders. This requires a change in processes of land allocation and in some 
land administration mechanisms; and a change in administrative culture (relationship 
between government officer and citizens). 
iii. Accountability: administrators are to be held accountable for their decisions by the 
affected stakeholders and the state should enforce an effective accountability framework. 
iv. Participatory and consultative: the process of land allocation and land 
administration should involve the affected and concerned stakeholders in a participatory 
and consultative process. 
v. Locality-specific and criteria based: it is crucial to acknowledge and understand 
the complexities of a particular socioeconomic and political context. The framework 
planning of land allocation and land use in the Province and on lower levels of 
administration need to base their decisions on local dynamics as well as on scientific and 
technically sound criteria. This applies, for example, for the implementation of the buffer 
zone policy in the tsunami affected areas.  
vi. Comprehensive: A sound land administration system will aim at alleviating 
inequities and inefficiencies in the allocation of land resources and in the provision of 
land tenure security. In a post- or semi post conflict setting, this can only be achieved if 
both the root and causes and consequences of conflict are taken into account. Addressing 
land and conflict issues demands an integrated and comprehensive approach. 
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ANNEX 1: THREE TYPES OF LAND DISPUTES IN THE NORTH AND EAST  
OF SRI LANKA 
 
This Annex scrutinizes and provides evidence for the different land issues listed and 
categorized in Table 4 of the main report. The main report has differentiated three types 
or levels of land issues: 
iv. Level 1: Inter-individual land disputes and property rights issues (individual-
individual, individual-state) which remain intra-ethnic and where there is no 
inter-ethnic dimension involved.  
v. Level 2: Inter-communal and inter-individual land disputes and property rights 
issues (individual-individual, individual-communal, communal-communal) with 
an inter-ethnic dimension involved. 
vi. Level 3: Inter-individual and inter-communal land disputes and property rights 
issues (individual-state, communal-communal, communal-state, conflict parties) 
where the inter-ethnic dimension has become dominant. These issues are highly 
politicized and considered as core fundamental grievances of one or more of the 
conflict parties. 
Within each of these three levels, the Annex specifies issues relating to land tenure and 
property rights, issues relating to (physical, spatial) land access and governance issues 
relating to land alienation and land administration (see para 27f. in the main report). For 
each type of conflict, different issues are listed and examples given with respective 
sources of evidence documented in footnotes (see reference list of main report for full 
details of the sources).  
 
INTER-INDIVIDUAL (PREDOMINANTLY INTRA-ETHNIC) LAND DISPUTES (LEVEL 1) 
This section reviews inter-individual disputes relating to residential and agricultural land. 
Such disputes are normally resolved by the existing legal and administrative system, such 
as courts in the case of privately owned land and the respective land administrative 
bodies in the case of alienated state land. Issues listed in this section can, in principle, be 
sorted out without political involvement and prior to a final solution to the conflict on the 
national level. 
Inter-individual disputes over land and property may emerge along a variety of issues 
related to the return of internally displaced persons and of refugees to their original 
place.
32
 Issues relating to tenure security, land access and land disputes on an inter-
individual basis can be classified as follows. 
 
                                                 
32
 Sources: UNHCR 2003, CPA 2003, 2005a; NEHRP 2004a, 20004b. 
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Land tenure and property rights: 
1. Disputed occupation of land (secondary occupants, encroachment of land): The 
massive destruction of housing and the reduction in usable land have forced many 
displaced or landless people to occupy vacant lands, houses and properties.
33
 
Because the war has been so lengthy, IDPs and refugees may have abandoned 
their properties for periods of up to 10-15 years and secondary occupants could 
have been using this land, property for a similar period.
34
 In some cases, 
secondary occupants cannot go back to their original homes, since these are 
located inaccessible locations (HSZ, LTTE areas). But there is also evidence that 
illegal occupation, especially in Jaffna, is used by some to earn money or settle 
old scores.
35
 Secondary occupants have often significantly invested in these lands 
and properties. In some instances, these secondary occupants use these areas as if 
these were their property. Some secondary occupants possess declaratory deeds in 
their favor, which would give them a prescriptive title of ownership. The lawful 
property owner (private property) can bring such case to the court. Court cases, 
however, are time-consuming and expected to take 5-10 years, and this time gap 
may substantially increase if a significant number of returnees filed their case in 
the courts. 
2. Disputed titles, false titles, illegal alienation of land (“Japan” deed): transfers 
under duress or forcible and fraudulent transfers:
36
  In some places, only part of a 
community was forced to flee or some people decided to move away and sold 
their property and land to those who remained for a price far below market values 
because they felt under duress. In some instances, people were allowed to leave 
an area only after surrendering their properties to those who restricted their 
movements. In some cases, these transfers were sought to be formalized with 
forged deeds or written declaratory deeds in relation to private and State land. 
Such “deeds” were then transferred to third parties who purchased this land bona 
fide and feel now in possession of this land. These persons have no remedies as 
they have purchased land or property for which the vendor did not have a title. 
The problem is that without resorting to a protracted legal procedure, the deed 
cannot be declared void.
37
 Such false deeds, commonly called “Japan deeds” are 
                                                 
33
 Such occupation can be differentiated in three types: (1) Occupants and owner, right holder are of the 
same ethnic group, (2) occupants and right holder are of different ethnic groups (occasionally, this includes 
politically encouraged encroachment of lands of the “ethnic other”), and (3) the occupant is one of the 
conflict parties (army or LTTE). This sub-section deals only with issues relating to (1). Issues relating to 
(2) and (3) will be dealt with in para 60 and 65 respectively. 
34
 The Prescription Ordinance permits a person to acquire the property of another through uninterrupted and 
undisturbed possession for ten or more years. (Source: CPA 2003, 16) 
35
 Source: CPA 2003. 
36
 Source: UNHCR 2003, 19. See Rösel (1997) for reports on such transfers in Trincomalee in the 1990s 
and various reports of the UTHR (J). 
37
 Note that these issues become even more protracted if returnee and secondary occupant belong to 
different ethnic groups. 
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in circulation in large quantities in Mannar, Vavuniya and Puttalam districts
38
 and 
many displaced persons have fallen victim to these fraudulent transactions.
39
  
3. Temple lands: Many Hindu temples have received large tracts of land as 
donations from devotees, in particular in Jaffna and in Trincomalee. Many of 
these temple lands are currently used for residential lands without proper 
agreements or documented tenancy. Some temples have lost their records and 
administration of remaining records has been poor. Some of the temples are 
located in South India. There may also be boundary disputes and illegal sales and 
transfers affected over a period of time.
40
 
4. Boundary disputes:41 Boundary disputes between neighboring land rights holders 
are difficult to resolve at present, because physical boundary structures are often 
dilapidated, overgrown or destroyed and documentation is often incomplete (title 
documents without survey maps), which make an exact identification of property 
boundaries difficult. Returnees may also face the situation that neighboring 
returnees arriving prior to them have created “facts on the ground” marking 
boundaries by erecting fences. Such disputes are particularly prominent in urban 
and semi-urban settlements, such as Jaffna. 
5. Loss, destruction of title documents:42 Many displaced persons have lost their title 
documents during the armed conflict. Persons who have lost their deed (private 
property) may apply for a certified copy at the District Land Registry. In the case 
of alienated state land, persons who have lost their permits or grants can apply for 
certified copies at the Divisional Secretariats (Table 5). However, documentation 
held by the state in land registries and the Kachcheries have partially been 
damaged or destroyed as an effect of armed confrontation (Table 6). The loss of 
title documentation creates immense problems in identifying land parcels and land 
boundaries, encumbrances and the owner or right holder of the land.  
6. Gender issues:43 The current legislative framework discriminates against women, 
especially titles of alienated state land. At present, when state land is granted 
under the LDO, the grant is made to the head of household and does not recognize 
joint ownership of land. Thus the female spouse has not legal control over such 
land. This has implications for situations in which a woman’s spouse has been 
killed or disappeared. If women are the heads of household (as widows), but are 
not recognized as such, they will not be able to legally uphold the title to the 
property. This is a serious concern for cases where the husband’s death is not 
documented, the man is missing or where the husband’s death is not recognized 
by state authorities. Furthermore, since women are often not aware about their 
                                                 
38
 Puttalam: Illegal alienation of land has affected relocated IDPs who wish to remain in their area of 
displacement. It is estimated that 60% of the land in Puttalam on which IDPs relocated is state land, which 
was fragmented and illegally sold by local Permit and Grant holders to IDPs. Source: CPA 2003, 8. 
39
 Source: NEHRP 2004a 
40
 Source: CPA 2005a; NEHRP 2004a, 2004b. 
41
 Sources: CPA 2005a, UNHCR 2003. 
42
 Source: CPA 2003, 2005a; NEHRP 2004a, 2004b; UNHCR 2003. 
43
 Source: CPA 2003, 2005a. 
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entitlements to land under resettlement schemes or other government welfare, 
they do not apply for such state benefits they are entitled for. 
 
Table 5: Types of Property Documents 
Type of land Document Copies kept by 
Private Deed 
Owner 
Notary Public 
District Land Registry 
State Annual Permit, LDO Permit 
Owner 
Divisional Secretariat 
LDO Grants 
Owner 
District Land Registry 
District or Divisional Secretariat 
Leases & other grants under the 
State Lands Ordinance 
Owner 
District Land Registry 
District or Divisional Secretariat 
Land Commissioner’s Office, Colombo 
Source:  CPA 2003 
Table 6: Damaged/lost documents at the District Land Registries in the North and East 
District Assessment of damage to land registries 
Jaffna Post-1940 documents of the Jaffna District were shifted to private premises eight times after 1986. On one 
of these occasions, the house where the documents were stored had been used by the LTTE and was 
captured by the Indian Peacekeeping Forces (IPKF). The IPKF reportedly used the register as fuel during 
the rainy season. Of the post-1940 documents, 1,325 volumes have been lost. All pre-1940 documents have 
been lost. 
 
Kilinochchi Prior to the opening of the Land Registry in 1990, registers for the Kilinochcho District were kept in Jaffna, 
All deeds registered before 1990 are still being kept in Jaffna; all those registered after 1990 are kept in 
Kilinochchi. Civil servants from the Registry removed the registers to Shantapural in 1995 as a precaution. 
The registers were shifted anew due to displacement in 1996. Most post-1990 documents are still intact. 
Kilinochchi volumes which were kept in Jaffna were destroyed by the IPKF in 1987. 
 
Mullaitivu The Mullaitivu Land Registry was opened in 1984. Following heavy fighting in 1990, the Registry was 
destroyed and, according to the Jaffna and Vavuniya Land Rgeistrars, all Mullaitivu registers were 
destroyed. 
 
Vavuniya Approximately 30 volumes from the pre-1940s have been damaged due to poor quality of paper. 
 
Mannar Approximately 30 volumes have been destroyed due to poor quality of paper. 
 
Batticaloa No land documents have been lost by the Land Registry, though a number of volumes were damaged 
following the 1978 flood. 
 
Trincomalee No documents have been lost by the Land Registry as a result of the conflict. However, a number of 
volumes stored before 1970 have been damaged due to the poor quality of the paper and storage, and 
following the 1964 cyclone. In addition, a small number of documents which were located at the Court 
were destroyed when the building was burnt down on two occasions. 
 
Source: CPA 2003, UNHCR 2003. 
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Land access: 
7. Landlessness among IDPs and refugees:44 Many IDPs and refugees have been 
landless laborers or tenant cultivators prior to displacement, among them many 
Upcountry Tamils who settled in the North and worked as tenant farmers or 
laborers or Upcountry Tamils who became displaced during the 1977 and 1983 
unrest who had encroached on state land in the North and East. It also includes the 
second generation of displaced persons who reached adulthood during the period 
of displacement, temporarily relocated or illegally relocated landless persons and 
settlers without documentation or encroachers (without political backing). Current 
resettlement and relocation policies
45
 advise that IDPs cannot be relocated on 
State land in any District other than that of their origin.
46
 However, many landless 
IDPs expressed the wish to be granted land in the area where they are currently 
residing. This applies particularly for IDPs in Vavuniya and Mannar.
47
  
8. Land access is severely restricted in some specific locations and areas due to 
landmines and Unexploded Ordinances: Landmines and Unexploded Ordinances 
(UXO) are lying in agricultural fields and paddy lands, the vicinities of residential 
homes, common places and shrub jungles. These mines pose serious threats to 
spontaneous returnees and prevent return of IDPs and refugees. Landmines and 
UXOs render large tracts of land unusable for agricultural cultivation and cattle 
grazing. It is estimated that approx. 900,000 mines are located in the North and 
East, especially concentrated in areas where military operations took place and 
along the lines of control demarcated by the conflict parties. Since mine clearance 
only proceeds slowly, right holders may be unable to access their property and 
land for a significant time into the future. For these cases, temporary and 
transitional accommodation needs to be provided until it is safe for them to 
repossess these locations.
48
 
9. Access problems and informal property rights relating to common-pool 
resources: Customary, informal use rights to common-pool resources, such as 
forests, lagoons, which are used for firewood collection, hunting, gathering and as 
grazing resources. These use rights often provide important livelihood sources for 
asset-poor households. These rights are in most cases not documented. At present, 
large parts of these areas are still inaccessible, partly inaccessible or civilians are 
reluctant to access these due to the pertinent mine problem, still pending security 
situation and increasing inter-communal tensions (in some areas of the East). 
Since it is mostly the marginal segments of a population who rely on such 
informal use rights, access restrictions may severely hamper their livelihood 
                                                 
44
 Source: CPA 2003, 3. 
45
 In the Sri Lankan context, “resettlement” refers to return to the original place, “relocation” means settling 
in a place different than the original home place. 
46
 This is so due to fear of changing ethnic population ratios in the new district, which could become ann 
issue of political concern in inter-ethnic relations. 
47
 Source: CPA 2003, 3. 
48
 Source: CPA 2003, UNHCR 2003. 
 46 
prospects.
49
 However, very little research is conducted on this and no reliable data 
available at present. 
 
Governance issues: 
10. Existing laws in Sri Lanka create serious impediments in obtaining re-possession 
from long-term occupiers and may discriminate against those who had to flee and 
leave their property:
50
 In the case of disputes over private land, the Prescription 
Ordinance and the Primary Courts Procedure Act provide that if a person was in 
occupation of a property for more than two months and a dispute occurred in 
relation to possession of the property, the person who was in possession will be 
permitted by courts to continue in possession until they were ejected by an order 
of a District court by a regular action. Such Court rule may take 5-10 years. 
Prescription Ordinance states that obtaining a prescriptive title requires proof of 
undisturbed and uninterrupted possession for 10 years by title adverse to that of a 
claimant. Since many secondary occupants also do not have a place to go back 
(for example, if their land is located in a HSZ), an extra-legal mediated solution to 
the dispute may be difficult to obtain.
51
  
11. There has been concern that Permit title holders may lose their use right to land 
due to displacement. State land alienated under the Land Development Ordinance 
(LDO) as permit or grant which can be reverted back to the State if conditions 
stated in the permit or grant document are not met by the title holders. In 
particular, a grant can be cancelled if the Permit holder has not developed the land 
or for breach of stipulated conditions. Land converted into a grant title can only 
be taken back by the state under the Land Acquisition Act. Vulnerable under this 
legislature are Permit holders who were displaced before they could convert their 
title into a grant, landless who were in the process of Permit application or 
encroachment regularization when displaced and people living on leased out land. 
For the latter, it may be difficult to prove their occupancy of such land now 
because of lack of title and the difficulty to obtain other forms of proof. A 
Government Circular was issued in 2002 that forbids the cancellation of the 
Permits of displaced persons.
52
   
12. Encroachment on state land has been common in the North and East (as it has in 
other places of Sri Lanka): A Government Circular issued by the National Land 
Commissioner requests relevant authorities not to regularize any encroachments 
that took place after the 15 June 1995. Part of the encroachment, often labeled 
“genuine” encroachment arises from the need of growing families to give land to 
their children or from displaced persons to find some place to stay. In other cases, 
encroachment has been politically supported by often unidentified forces, with the 
                                                 
49
 Source: Korf et al. 2001; Korf 2003. 
50
 Source: UNHCR 2003, CPA 2003. 
51
 There are reports that lawyers in Jaffna appear to have informally agreed not to use the Prescription 
Ordinance if the original owner was absent as a result of war. (Source: CPA 2005a, 46). 
52
 Source: CPA 2003, 51. 
 47 
help or silent consent of Army and Police or the LTTE.
53
 Or militant groups have 
illegally alienated land to IDPs, for example in Vavuniya. If such encroachment 
raises issues of inter-ethnic concern, they are to be classified under Level (3) 
types of issues, since their resolution needs to be incorporated into a broad 
political settlement (see below). 
13. The LTTE has established an own administrative, legal and court system in the 
areas coming under its control. Land and property come under the purview of 
both the Government and the LTTE. In the LTTE controlled Vanni, land 
occupation is an issue resolved by the Government administrative structures along 
with the Tamil Eelam Police Force. Reportedly, IDPs occupying property are 
permitted to remain until the owners make claims for the property. Claimants first 
have to approach the Village Committees which operate in LTTE controlled 
areas. The Tamil Eelam police also attempts to resolve property disputes, failing 
which cases are filed in Tamil Eelam Courts.
54
 In the uncleared areas of the East, 
both, the courts administered by the government and the courts administered by 
the LTTE operate.
55
 This dual system of courts can create confusion amongst 
civilians regarding the effectiveness and jurisdiction of both. In some cases, a 
party that feels unhappy about the ruling of one system may resort to a ruling of 
the other system. Furthermore, some people have sought to receive property titles 
from both administrations.
56
 To some extent, LTTE courts are also approached by 
Tamils living in the cleared areas (which have been partially under control of 
LTTE during the night).
57
 
A number of additional issues relating to land can create disputes over land, affect tenure 
insecurity or provide access problems, but these issues are common to all places in Sri 
Lanka and are not confined to the conflict-affected North and East. Among those issues 
are land fragmentation (subdivision of grants below stipulated limits), surveying costs, 
customary laws (e.g. Tessawalami Law for Northern Tamils, Muslim law) governing 
inheritance issues etc. Since these issues are not caused by or directly related to the armed 
conflict, they are not dealt with here.
58
 However, it is important to note that some of these 
issues may await resolution because the overall administrative management capacity to 
deal with these issues is weakened by the conflict, which may delay resolution of such 
minor disputes significantly, causing further resentment. 
 
INTER-ETHNIC LAND DISPUTES (LEVEL 2 AND LEVEL 3 DISPUTES) 
When land disputes entail an inter-ethnic dimension, they easily become more protracted, 
because local disputes are often linked with broader inter-ethnic grievances relating to 
land colonization, armed conflict and suffering caused by the “ethnic other”. It is 
important to distinguish two different types of inter-ethnic conflicts:  
                                                 
53
 Source: UNHCR 2003. 
54
 Source: CPA 2003, 57. 
55
 Sources:  CPA 2003, 2005a. 
56
 Source: Korf et al. 2001. 
57
 Source: Korf et al. 2001. 
58
 See, for example, CPA 2005a, NEHRP 2004a,b. 
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i. Level (2) types of conflict relate to inter-ethnic conflicts on a community or inter-
community level, which may be solvable on a local or regional level through 
some form of negotiation between local or regional community representatives.  
ii. Level (3) types of conflict can be categorized as highly politicized issues relating 
to broader territorial claims. Level (3) conflicts can only be solved through high-
level negotiations between the conflict parties. 
Some issues elaborated as Level (2) type conflicts may become politicized to an extent 
that they need to be categorized as Level (3) type conflicts. This may be the case if they 
are not appropriately handled on an inter-communal level and become a source of inter-
ethnic grievances, which go out of hand or which are used by political spoilers to steer 
inter-ethnic resentment. Examples could be Sinhalese grievances about inaccessible land 
controlled by the LTTE or Tamil-Muslim grievances over land access, or disputes over 
religious structures.  
 
LEVEL (2) TYPE LAND DISPUTES 
Level (2) type land conflicts largely relate to agricultural land and related use rights. Such 
conflicts involve persons from different ethnic groups and often relate to different user 
rights, such as the right to cultivation, the right to irrigation water, the right to by-pass 
land in order to access own land etc. Since agriculture is still the backbone of the 
economy in the North and East, such disputes, if remaining unresolved, can unduly delay 
economic recovery of the North and East and make many people unable to undertake 
their livelihood activities. Many, though not all of these, inter-ethnic disputes are located 
in the East. Often, such disputes continued to aggrieve the communities throughout the 
period of armed conflict, but only after the ceasefire agreement did they come to the open 
and some of them turned violent.  
The overall picture of these inter-ethnic conflicts relating to land is very complex and 
place-specific. Most of these Level (2) type conflicts go beyond inter-individual conflicts 
and involve whole communities or groups of people. Still, there is no comprehensive 
assessment of all such inter-ethnic disputes throughout the North and East. The following 
schematic description of typical land conflicts is therefore not comprehensive for the 
whole North and East. 
 
Land tenure and property rights: 
1. Inter-ethnic disputes over water allocation in irrigation schemes: Disputes over 
water resource allocation is a common feature in many irrigation schemes. These 
disputes largely occur between upstream farmers and so-called tail enders 
(downstream farmers). Upstream farmers can partially or completely negate 
downstream farmers their entitlements to water by allocating more water to their 
own fields as agreed in the water distribution regulations or by completely 
blocking the flow of water to downstream farmers. If such water blockade is 
executed during crucial periods of the cultivation cycle, this can seriously harm 
the yields of downstream farmers. In most major irrigation schemes in the East 
(Kantalai, Allai, Gal Oya), it is usually the Sinhalese settlers who were colonized 
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upstream and Tamil and Muslim settlers were settled downstream. Thus, 
Sinhalese settlers control the flow of water in these schemes. There have been 
reported disputes in most irrigation schemes of the East, because upstream 
Sinhalese farmers have denied appropriate water allocation to downstream Tamil 
and Muslim farmers.
59
 In Muttur area, Trincomalee district, after the ceasefire 
agreement, when Tamil-Muslim tensions increased, Tamil farmers threatened to 
interrupt the flow of water to downstream Muslim fields.
60
 
2. Inter-ethnic disputes over competing land uses:  these disputes often occur due to 
competing land use claims between land users of different ethnic origin. Often 
user rights over land are informal. For example, there is a prominent conflict in 
Amparai district around Wattamadu tank between cattle owners and paddy 
cultivators over the use of land either as grazing land or as cultivation land. In this 
case, the majority of cattle owners are Tamils and most cultivators are Muslims. 
After the ceasefire agreement, this conflict has emerged into the open and has 
been relabeled as an inter-ethnic conflict.
61
 There are also inter-ethnic land 
disputes between Tamil and Sinhalese and Sinhalese and Muslims.
62
 Often, such 
disputes arise because one party has encroached on land with the silent consent of 
one of the conflict parties. Increasing land scarcity along the coastal zone in the 
East makes such disputes over competing land claims more likely to arise. For 
example, there are some conflicting claims on land due to alternating use of land 
by Sinhalese and Tamil residents during periods of ethnic disturbances, where one 
group occupied or utilized land previously held by the other group. Such 
grievances are particularly prominent in highly disputed areas. 
3. Fishing landing rights: These disputes are between fisher folk of different villages 
and between local and migrant Sinhalese fishermen, particularly in Mannar, but 
there are also issues on migrant Sinhalese fishermen in the East. In Trincomalee, 
migrant fishermen received preferential treatment by the navy for fishing rights 
during the ongoing armed conflict. In Mannar, Sinhalese fishermen have returned 
after the ceasefire agreement and this has increased the pressure on fisheries 
resources.
63
  
4. Inter-ethnic land transfers: inter-ethnic land transfers in the last years have played 
an important role to increase inter-ethnic tensions, in particular between Tamils 
and Muslims along the East coast. Often, such land is sold when a particular 
ethnic group faces economic hardship or feels insecure in a particular location. 
Tamils in the East, particularly in Batticaloa and Amparai districts have voiced 
concern about Muslims buying land in this manner. Many Muslims have invested 
profits in fixed property and have managed to acquire large tracts of lands from 
Tamils adjacent to or enmeshed in larger Muslim settlements.
64
 Tamil tenant 
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 Sources: FCE 2003; Hasbullah et al. 2005; Korf et al. 2001; Korf 2005. 
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 Source: Korf 2005. 
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 Source: Hasbullah et al. 2005. 
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 Sources: Hasbullah et al. 2005; Korf et al. 2001; Korf 2005. 
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 Source: Hasbullah et al. 2005. 
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 Source: Hasbullah et al. 2005; FCE 2003. 
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cultivators in Muttur have tried to intimidate Muslim land owners with the threat 
of involving the LTTE.
65
 
5. Land disputes between returnee and secondary occupants being from different 
ethnic groups:  This returnee problem is particularly acute in Mannar, where still 
many Tamil IDPs occupy land left by Muslims who fled to other locations.
66
 Such 
disputing claims easily get linked with broader inter-ethnic grievances and 
stereotypes of the “ethnic other” and are breeding grounds for ethnic tensions. 
 
Land access: 
6. Land access in inter-ethnic areas:67 In the agro-economic system of the East, the 
place of residence and the place of agricultural land use (farming, cattle grazing) 
are often located in different locations. This is particularly the case for Muslims 
who are often residing in market towns, but possess land in areas adjacent to 
Tamil settlements. In times of inter-ethnic tension, Muslims are reluctant or 
unable to access their fields. Many have abandoned these fields or sold them for a 
low price to Tamil farmers, for example in Muttur area.
68
 
 
Governance: 
7. Disputes over religious symbols: Some inter-ethnic disputes have also arisen 
around religious symbols. In 2002, Tamil-Muslim riots emerged in Muttur after 
14 Christian crosses erected on a hill top in the vicinity of Tamil and Muslim 
villages.
69
 In Uoosimookanthural (Mannar Island), disputes between Tamils and 
Muslims erupted over a permanent structure erected for a church.
70
 More recently, 
there has been concern among Tamils and Muslims over Buddha statues being 
built on public grounds in Trincomalee town and in Pottuvil, Amparai. 
8. Resentment towards increasing power and influence of Muslim politicians in 
allocation of state land (Amparai): Both Sinhalese and Tamil politicians have 
expressed growing concern about the influence of Muslim politicians in alienating 
state land and allocating state welfare resources to Muslims at the expense of 
Tamils and Sinhalese.
71
 Sinhalese politicians are expressing concern about 
organized efforts of local Muslim politicians in the Amparai area to acquire state 
lands.
72
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 Sources: FCE 2003; Korf 2005.  
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 Source: Hasbullah 2001; Hasbullah et al. 2005. 
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 Source: Hasbullah et al. 2005. 
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 Source: Korf 2005. 
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 Source: Liyanage + Hasbullah 2004. 
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 Source: Hasbullah et al. 2005. 
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 Source: Hasbullah et al. 2005; Korf 2005. Amparai has always been a partial stronghold of Muslim 
politicians. At the same time, there is evidence to believe that the powers of Muslim politicians and 
administrators may have become weaker after the ceasefire agreement. 
72
 Source: Hasbullah et al. 2005. 
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9. Biased or ineffective administrative rulings on inter-ethnic land rights disputes: 
Whenever there is an inter-ethnic dimension to a land dispute, the local 
administration is largely unable to implement current land laws, for example 
against illegal encroachers or farmers diverting water illegally in irrigation 
schemes. This is particularly so when these farmers are backed by powerful 
groups, such as Buddhist monks, military and police in the case of Sinhalese or 
LTTE in the case of Tamils. Overall, Muslims are in a comparatively weaker 
position; however, Muslims also had some administrative strongholds in the 
Amparai district and have used this partly in favor of their community. Lack of 
transparency and accountability nourishes suspicion between the ethnic groups 
when state land is alienated to landless of one ethnic group. This is particular of 
concern in multi-ethnic areas, such as Mannar, Batticaloa, Amparai and Muttur.  
 
LEVEL (3) TYPE LAND DISPUTES 
Level (3) type conflicts relate to broader territorial claims of the different conflict parties 
and ethnic groups and are of such scale that their resolution or containment requires high-
level negotiations. Some of these negotiations may be possible prior to a final peace 
agreement; others will only be part of a final settlement between the conflict parties. 
Although Level (3) type conflicts are linked with broader territorial claims, they relate to 
land resources, which are fundamentally required for civilians to pursue their livelihoods. 
 
Land tenure and property rights: 
1. Inter-ethnic land transfers of land and property, particularly in and around 
Trincomalee: There are reports about encroachment of residential land in 
Trincomalee, where Sinhalese took over property left by Tamil owners during the 
armed conflict, often being encouraged by unidentified segments of the security 
forces.
73
 There are also concerns among Tamils about encroachment of Sinhalese 
farmers on abandoned Tamil land and paddy fields, for example in Pankulam, 
where land abandoned by Tamils is cultivated by Sinhalese farmers with the 
consent of the security forces.
74
 Trincomalee district is of particular concern due 
to its strategic location at the transition between North and East, the harbor and 
Trincomalee being the provincial capital. A major concern of Tamil 
representatives is their fear that some nationalist segments of the Sinhalese 
political constituency may attempt to use such encroachments for gradual changes 
in ethnic composition, especially in Trincomalee town.  
2. Sinhalese encroachment close to military camps:75 There is increasing concern 
among Tamils about Sinhalese unofficially settling, with help or consent of 
security forces, along army camps. Especially unofficial settlements of Sinhalese 
along the main road from Habarana to Trincomalee and in the fish market area in 
Trincomalee have created resentment among Tamils, because they are seen as 
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 Sources: Rösel 1997; UTHR (J) – Report No. 11 (UTHR (J) (1993a). 
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 Sources: Balasundarampillai 2002; Rösel 1997; UTHR (J) (1993a). 
75
 Sources: UNHCR 2003; UTHR (J) 1993a, 1993b. 
 52 
calculated attempts to disturb the ethnic ratio or demography of the region.
76
 
There are also reports that agencies, such as the Mahaweli Authority, have given 
lands in the East to people with no reference to previous ownership or 
occupancy.
77
  
 
Land access: 
3. Land inaccessible for Tamil farmers located in high security zones and land or 
property occupied by military: Tamil grievances are particularly high regarding 
the High Security Zone (HSZ) in Jaffna, which occupies large tracts of fertile 
land, religious grounds and residential lands.
78
 In addition, there are other places 
in the North and East, where the Sri Lankan security forces occupy land and 
property for buildings, fortifications and bunkers. While the army has vacated 
some buildings and lands since the ceasefire agreement, there are still a lot of 
places and properties occupied by the security forces. This issue is politically 
highly charged, in particular in Jaffna due to the large extent of land occupied by 
the security forces. One report notes that in some cases, the army in Jaffna has 
been conciliatory and has allowed owners to check properties, but the policy 
appears to be ad hoc, not based on clear, transparent criteria.
79
 Army occupation 
of land is a serious impediment to resettlement and return of displaced persons, 
particularly in Jaffna and Mannar.
80
 
4. Land inaccessible for Muslims in LTTE controlled areas:81 In the area under its 
control in the North and East, the LTTE has taken over large tracts of abandoned 
land, mostly belonging to Muslims. The land has been subsequently given to 
families of LTTE cadres, been rented or used by LTTE to host administrative 
structures. Partly, it appears that some abandoned land is also occupied by LTTE 
camps. The LTTE also seems to have allowed displaced persons living in 
uncleared area to settle on other people’s land. In Batticaloa, land belonging to 
Muslims is being farmed by the LTTE or by local farmers with the consent of the 
LTTE. This issue has become a high-level source of contention between the 
Muslim and LTTE leaders and high-level negotiations have been carried out in 
2002 and 2003. Although some agreements have been signed between LTTE and 
Muslim representatives, it appears that up to present, there has not been a 
retransfer of lands to Muslims on a larger scale in the East.
82
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 Source: UNHCR 2003, 18. It needs to be noted that unofficial land occupation by Sinhalese encroacher, 
mostly from outside Trincomalee district, on the Habarana-Trincomalee road has continued to take place 
even after the ceasefire agreement. 
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 Sources: UNHCR 2003. 
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 Sources: CPA 2003, 2005a; Hasbullah et al. 2005; UNHCR 2003. 
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 Source: CPA 2003, 47. 
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 Source: CPA 2003, Hasbullah et al. 2005; UNHCR 2003. 
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 Sources: CPA 2003, 2005a; FCE 2003; Hasbullah et al. 2005; Rupesinghe 2002. 
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 The  Muslim Rights Organisation (MRO) and the Foundation for Co-existence (FCE) have established a 
Land Register that systematically enumerates the land claims of the Muslims in the North and East. The 
investigation collected information about the date of acquisition of land, the manner in which it was 
acquired, the extent of the land, the deeds (or titles) to the land, the extent of property and livestock kept in 
the land. Subsequently, Land Committees were established in some all three districts of the East (Source: 
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5. Land inaccessible for Sinhalese located in or close to LTTE controlled areas 
(border villages):
83
 Some Sinhalese border villages are located close to LTTE 
camps. Therefore, Sinhalese farmers are reluctant to return to their villages or to 
cultivate fields located at remote places.
84
 There are also some conflicting claims 
on land due to alternating use of land by Sinhalese and Tamil residents during 
periods of communal disturbances.
85
 Overall, Sinhalese farmers are increasingly 
concerned about their future under an LTTE dominated administrative structure of 
the North and East. Also, there are complaints from Sinhalese farmers that the 
provincial land administration would delay distribution of land titles to farmers in 
Sinhalese border villages, because the provincial administration is dominated by 
Tamil bureaucrats. 
 
Governance: 
6. The central government has alienated large tracts of land to government 
corporative bodies:
86
 In Trincomalee, large tracts of land have been alienated to 
the Sri Lanka Ports Authority. Such land lies outside of the administrative powers 
of the provincial administration. On some of these lands, for example along the 
Trincomalee-Batticaloa road
87
, Sinhalese mostly from outside the district have 
unofficially and illegally settled with the support of unknown forces. This 
encroachment continues since the provincial administration is unable to take 
action against encroachment, which is silently consented by the security forces.  
7. Devolution and administrative powers over land administration:  The distribution 
of administrative powers over state land has been an important issue in all 
negotiations between Tamil and Sinhalese representatives since the 1950s. As it is 
currently ruled according to Annexure 2 of the 13
th
 amendment, the provincial 
council is in charge of state land administration, but there are some, important, 
exceptions: Land coming under inter-provincial colonization schemes are 
governed by the Central government, which is economically most important land, 
since most major irrigation schemes are inter-provincial. The President retains the 
overriding powers for land alienation (Article 33(d) of the constitution).
88
 In 
addition, the Annexure suggests policies regarding ethnicity distribution in land 
colonization schemes. The disputes between the conflict parties is about who has 
effective administrative power over state land alienation.  
                                                                                                                                                 
FCE 2003). With increasing intra-Tamil tensions in violence in 2004, most of these committees are now 
defunct. 
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 Sources: Chmela 2004; FCE 2003; Hasbullah et al. 2005; Korf et al. 2001. 
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 Depending on the situation and the gravity of the grievance, such conflicts could also be categorized as 
Level (3) type conflict, because informal inter-communal negotiation between community leaders is more 
unlikely to happen than in case of Tamil-Muslim land disputes.  
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 Source: Hasbullah et al. 2005. 
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 Source: UTHR (J) 1993a. 
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 Source: UNHCR 2003. 
88
 Appendix II of the 13
th
 Amendment states: “alienation or disposition of State land within a province to 
any citizen or to any organization shall be by the President, on the advice of the relevant Provincial Council 
in accordance with the laws governing that matter.” (emphasis added) 
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8. Boundary redrawing of districts and divisional secretariats:  District boundaries 
and delineation of divisional secretariat divisions have been changed several times 
in the past. In most cases, such redrawing carved out an ethnically homogenous 
area from a larger administrative entity into a new one. The founding of Amparai 
district out of Batticaloa district in the 1960s is the most prominent one, but there 
have been a number of other administrative boundary reforms, especially on 
divisional secretariat level. In recent years, such changes have mainly been done 
in Amparai district to create ethnically homogenous divisional secretariats. 
Boundary changes have caused serious concerns among representatives from 
different ethnic constituencies. However, it is important to note that especially in 
the Amparai district, it is difficult to construct ethnically homogenous divisional 
secretariat divisions due to the mixed settlement patterns.
89
  
9. Militarization of administration in some parts of the North and East:  In the 
highly disputed areas, e.g. under Weli Oya schemes, and through the 
establishment of home guards in Sinhalese border villages, there has been a 
militarization of Sinhalese civil society in these locations and of the 
administrative powers. Similarly, the growing power of the LTTE as 
administrator in uncleared areas has given special weight to military 
organizational structures. There have also been signs of increasing militarization 
of Muslim youth in the East. Such militarization contravenes transparent and 
accountable governance of land administration matters. 
10. Strategic (militarized) settlements in the North and East established during the 
mid 1980s:
90
  With the escalation of the conflict, strategic settlements were 
implemented in the Eastern Province under the Allai, Kanthalai and Mahaweli 
irrigation schemes. Most prominent is the Weli Oya scheme, as part of Mahaweli 
L System. This scheme covers parts of Trincomalee, Mullaitivu, Vavuniya and 
Anuradapura districts, but the area allocated to this scheme was declared a special 
zone governed by the Anuradapura District authorities. Tamil representatives 
have perceived these Sinhalese settlements as a strategic move to disrupt the 
settlement pattern from North to East through an establishment of a militarized 
Sinhalese settlement corridor.
91
 In part, there has been displacement of Tamil 
villages for the inception of these settlements.
92
 These settlements will be high on 
the agenda in any political settlement between the conflict parties.
93
 Sinhalese 
settlers from these border villages and settlements often complain about lack of 
security due to threats from LTTE, partial inaccessibility of their fields etc.
94
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ANNEX 2: MECHANISMS FOR ADDRESSING LAND AND CONFLICT IN THE NORTH 
AND EAST OF SRI LANKA 
 
 
In this annex (Table 8), different strategies for addressing land issues on the three levels 
of conflict (Table 4, Table 7 and Annex 1) are suggested. These suggestions are based on 
the following premises: 
i. Level 1 type conflicts about inter-individually disputed land rights claims (e.g. 
boundary conflicts, no action policies against illegal encroachments, secondary 
occupants) are expressions of the volatile security situation and the dynamics of 
the post-conflict situation, which overextend existing governance structures and 
administrative as well as judiciary capacities.  
ii. Level 2 type conflicts (e.g. local conflicts over land, which become communal, 
e.g. Tamil-Muslim tensions in the East, land disputes between Sinhalese and 
Tamil farmers, ethnically biased water distribution in irrigation schemes) have the 
potential to instigate local and regional inter-ethnic tensions and thus disturb the 
peace process. They often arise from local mismanagement and biased 
governance of land allocation and restricted land access.  
iii. Level 3 type conflicts (e.g. encouraged encroachment on Trincomalee-Colombo 
road, take over of abandoned Tamil land by Sinhalese, Muslim land by LTTE or 
Tamil farmers, administrative responsibilities between centre and province) are 
considered to be highly politicized, of a significant geographical scale and have 
become part of the political stakes and “emotional” core issues in the conflict. 
Such land issues require a political settlement and will have to be resolved 
through high-level negotiations between the LTTE and the Sri Lankan 
government. 
Furthermore, we have distinguished issues relating to three categories: land tenure and 
property rights, land access and governance (see para 27f.).  
 
Table 8: Mechanisms for Addressing Land and Conflict in the North and East  
 
Level 1 type Level 2 type Level 3 type 
Land tenure and property rights: 
Fast track mechanisms to resolve 
inter-individual land disputes and to 
relieve existing administrative and 
judicial bodies from burdens created 
by the post-conflict situation.  
Fast-track mechanisms may include: 
 provincial land task force as 
established under the NEHRP, 
which documents and deals 
with minor land issues,  
Land tenure and property rights: 
Inter-communal mechanisms of 
mediation and communication. 
Sometimes, such mechanisms, e.g. 
peace committees, have been 
established, but are often defunct, 
especially after a period of non-
violence.  
Important stakeholders include: 
 influential and accepted actors, 
such as religious leaders, in 
negotiations, 
Land tenure and property rights: 
High-level negotiations between the 
LTTE and the Sri Lankan 
government. 
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 temporary extra-judicial 
mechanisms to complement 
court system in resolution of 
land issues pertaining to post-
conflict or post-tsunami issues, 
especially relating to IDP return 
or relocation (see UNHCR 
proposals on this, UNHCR 
2003, 2005). 
 Mediation Boards, which have 
been established by the 
government. However, in the 
North and East, these are only 
working in a few areas and 
there are questions about their 
political credibility. 
Note: Such fast-track mechanisms 
are temporary and do not solve 
deeper rooted structural causes of 
conflict or governance failures. 
Note: Establishment of fast-track 
mechanisms would require a 
consensus of major stakeholders, 
including the parties to the conflict, 
the provincial administration, the 
central government to gain 
legitimacy in its decisions. 
Note: Establishment of fast-track 
mechanism, if substituting the 
judicial system, would need to be 
enacted through legislation and it 
would need to be clarified how such 
fast-track mechanisms relate to the 
existing judicial system (would 
aggrieved parties still have the right 
to bring their case to court?). 
Note: To gain credibility, fast-track 
mechanisms need to be transparent 
about criteria and processes of 
dispute resolution. This will 
counterbalance the current culture of 
clientelism and ethnicism.  
 
 combatant parties and police, 
which should be consulted, but 
not get directly involved in 
negotiations, 
 a neutral facilitator (e.g. inter-
national ombudsperson?) may 
be helpful if accepted by all 
parties to the conflict. 
Note: Such mechanisms to be 
effective need to be able to establish 
legitimacy for their decisions and to 
be considered as representing the 
different parties to the conflict. 
Note: Existing committees and 
mechanisms need to be analyzed for 
potential political or ethnic biases 
before they can be strengthened and 
capacitated for conflict mediation. 
Note:  In case of unequal power 
relations between different ethnic 
groups, an outside ombudsman may 
be needed to level the playing field 
and allow fair negotiations.  
Note:  Combatant parties and 
politicians should be incorporated 
beforehand to grant their support, 
but they should not become involved 
in the actual negotiation processes, 
which should remain confined to 
local leaders and representatives. 
Note:  It needs to be established how 
binding agreements found through 
such committees are for all involved 
stakeholders, including government 
authorities in charge of land 
administration. 
 
Land access: 
Gathering more comprehensive data 
on the exact scope, the location and 
the effects of land access issues, such 
as second generation landlessness, 
land mines problems and access 
problems to common-pool resources. 
Incorporate these concerns in overall 
local, regional planning frames. 
Note:  Mapping out major access 
problems, in particular informal user 
rights, for each district may be 
important data for district 
Land access: 
Ensuring continuation of those inter-
communal mediation mechanisms 
may help establish more trust on 
inter-ethnic relations so that access 
to their land is ensured for all ethnic 
groups continuously.  
Note:  Peace committees would need 
to get more pro-actively involved in 
improving inter-ethnic relations in 
order to deal with access problems 
to land and resources. 
Land access: 
In general highly sensitive and 
neither LTTE nor Sri Lankan armed 
forces have shown willingness to 
address the core issues, but localized 
negotiation with persons-in-
command my allow some low-
profile pragmatic solutions.  
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framework planning and 
coordination of agencies’ projects. 
 
Note:  Most of these access problems 
require political stability to become 
redundant, because they require 
rebuilding of inter-ethnic trust on 
community-level. 
 
Governance  
Encourage the government to clarify 
the regulations concerning secondary 
occupancy (see UNHCR proposals), 
and improve the enforcement of such 
regulations vis-à-vis political 
interference, militants etc.  
Investigate the establishment of 
regional, ethnically neutral clearance 
mechanism (e.g. boards of appeal) 
for aggrieved parties to address and 
clarify the enforcement mechanisms 
of such boards vis-à-vis respective 
government agencies.  
Governance issues 
Strengthen the operative capacities 
of these inter-communal mechanisms 
to substantiate their legitimacy, 
credibility and leverage power vis-à-
vis spoilers, local politicians and 
biased administrators. 
 
Governance  
High-level negotiations between the 
LTTE and the Sri Lankan 
government. 
 
Tsunami-specific issues: 
Ensure transparency and 
accountability in 
 beneficiary selection in land and 
housing allocation, 
 framework planning of 
relocation (who is located 
where and according to which 
criteria?). 
Establish independent boards of 
appeal for aggrieved parties and 
clarify their enforcement mechanism 
vis-à-vis other governmental 
agencies. 
 
Tsunami-specific issues: 
Ensure transparency and 
accountability in 
 beneficiary selection in land and 
housing allocation, 
 survey conflict-affected and 
tsunami-affected IDPs and 
apply the same eligibility 
criteria to both, 
 framework planning of 
relocation (who is located 
where and according to which 
criteria?). 
Establish independent boards of 
appeal for aggrieved parties and 
clarify their enforcement mechanism 
vis-à-vis other governmental 
agencies. 
 
Tsunami-specific issues: 
n.a. 
 
 
For Level 1 type land issues, the core challenge is the dramatic increase in land disputes 
due to population return, which is likely to overburden existing administrative and 
judicial bodies. The latter therefore need support in their capacities to tackle pending 
cases through an acceptable fast-track mechanism. Such fast-track mechanisms could, for 
example, deal with minor land disputes surrounding residential land and/or boundary 
disputes. 
For Level 2 type conflicts, inter-ethnic conflict resolution mechanisms on community 
level need to be encouraged and strengthened. The challenge for community-based inter-
ethnic dispute resolution mechanisms is that in the context of the conflict-affected areas, 
 58 
they will need to involve the two combatant parties in the ethnic conflict at some point in 
the resolution process. If the support from the involved communities for these 
mechanisms and the involved actors is strong, their leverage power vis-à-vis the 
combatant parties and political interference will be more pronounced. One may also 
consider establishing neutral ombudspersons as facilitators if such an involvement is 
considered appropriate and helpful by the concerned dispute parties. Since Level 2 type 
conflicts can easily become more politicized, it is advisable to search for mechanisms, 
which keep out political spoilers and which are based on pragmatic resolution of disputes 
rather than political bargaining. 
To establish and strengthen their authority, such alternative mechanisms of dispute 
resolution need to be appropriately legitimized and capacitated for their responsibilities. 
In the case of fast-track mechanisms for minor dispute resolution (Level 1 type conflicts), 
the Sri Lankan government would need to pass appropriate legislation to grant special 
conditions for these particular dispute cases and define the exact powers and 
responsibilities of such a fast-track mechanism. Further, it would need to be clarified 
whether or not decisions from such fast-track mechanisms are substituting the right of 
dispute parties to file their case to the courts afterwards. Such legislation would need to 
be based on a consensus among the major political stakeholders, including the LTTE and 
Tamil parliamentary parties, to gain effective credibility. These fast-track mechanisms 
could entail district-wide committees with representatives of different ethnic (and 
political groups) and a technical support team, which would map out the different cases, 
gather the evidence and make suggestions for their resolution. This procedure would 
allow transparency and accountability in the process and ensure political backing of 
decisions. 
For Level 2 type conflicts, there often exist some informal mechanisms of inter-ethnic 
dispute resolution on the ground. However, many of these committees and mechanisms 
are either defunct, lack enforcement capacity or are politically biased and therefore, prior 
to any engagement with existing mechanisms, such biases need to be carefully 
investigated. On local or regional level, there are often a number of respected “leaders”, 
often religious clergy or influential business persons, who have gained the confidence of 
a particular community. Establishing independent committees for dispute resolution will 
require the consent from all important stakeholders, including combatants, politicians and 
government officials, but the latter should be discouraged to stand on such committees, 
because this is likely to polarize the dispute resolution process.  
 
